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Abstract
The Maastricht convergence criteria set constraints on both monetary and scal policies in the EMU
Accession Countries. This paper uses a DSGE model of a two sector small open economy with distortionary
taxes to address the following question: How do the Maastricht convergence criteria modify an optimal
monetary and scal policy mix in an economy facing domestic and external shocks?
We nd that targets of the unconstrained optimal monetary and scal policy are similar to those of the
optimal monetary policy alone. The constrained policy is characterised by additional elements that penalize
uctuations of monetary and scal variables around the new targets which are di¤erent from the steady
state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy.
Under the chosen parameterization (which aims to reect the Czech Republic economy) the optimal
monetary and scal policy violates three Maastricht criteria: on the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest
rate and decit to GDP ratio. Both the stabilization component and deterministic component of the con-
strained policy are di¤erent from the unconstrained optimal policy. Since monetary criteria play a dominant
role in a¤ecting the stabilization process of the constrained policy, CPI ination and the nominal interest
are characterised by a smaller variability (than under the unconstrained policy) at the expense of a higher
variability of decit to GDP ratio. The constrained policy is characterised by a deationary bias which
results in targeting the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower by 1.3% (in annual
terms) than the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. The
constrained policy is also characterised by targeting surplus to GDP ratio at around 3.7%. As a result the
policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria induces additional welfare costs that amount to
60% of the initial deadweight loss associated with the optimal policy.
JEL Classication: F41, E52, E58, E61.
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1 The introduction
Monetary policy has been used as the main stabilization tool in many countries. Interestingly, EMU accession
countries, on their way to EMU, face the Maastricht criteria that put serious constraints on their monetary
policies (as it was analyzed in Lipin´ska (2008)). Specically, the countries should achieve a high and durable
degree of price stability, which is, in quantitative terms, reected in low ination rates and low long term interest
rates. Additionally, nominal exchange rates of the EMU accession countries versus the euro should stay within
normal uctuation margins. At the same time, scal policy that could be seen as an additional stabilization tool
is bound by the restrictions imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact. Accordingly, these countries should be
characterized by a sustainable government nancial position which is dened in terms of upper limits on decit
to GDP ratio and debt to GDP ratio. At the moment many EMU accession countries do not satisfy some of
the criteria.1
In this context a number of questions arise: Can scal policy serve as an additional stabilization tool in the
presence of restrictions set on monetary policy? How does this ability of scal policy to mitigate business cycles
change when faced with scal constraints as well? In general, what should be the optimal monetary and scal
policy that satises all the Maastricht criteria? And nally, which criteria: scal or monetary ones put stronger
constraints on stabilization macroeconomic policies?
To this purpose, we develop a DSGE model of a small open economy with nominal rigidities, distortionary
taxation and government debt exposed to both domestic and external shocks. The model is an extension of the
framework constructed by Lipin´ska (2008) where scal policy does not issue any debt and taxes are assumed to
be lump sum. Importantly, as in Lipin´ska (2008) the production structure is composed of two sectors: nontraded
and home traded sector. In that way, we want to take into account recent empirical literature both on OECD and
EMU Accession countries that highlights the role of sector specic shocks in explaining international business
cycle uctuations (see e.g. Canzoneri et al. (1999), Marimon and Zilibotti (1998), Mihaljek and Klau (2004)).
Finally, following Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Benigno and De Paoli (2006) monetary and scal policy
is conducted in a fully coordinated way by a single policy maker.
In this framework we characterize the optimal monetary and scal policy from a timeless perspective (Wood-
ford (2003)). As in Lipin´ska (2008), we derive the micro founded loss function using the second order approx-
imation methodology developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). We
nd that the optimal monetary and scal policy (unconstrained policy) should not only target ination rates
in the domestic sectors and aggregate output uctuations but also domestic and international terms of trade.
Subsequently, we present how the loss function changes when the monetary and scal policy is constrained by
the Maastricht convergence criteria. We derive the optimal monetary and scal policy that satises all the
Maastricht convergence criteria (constrained policy). Importantly, the Maastricht convergence criteria are not
easily implementable in our model. Here we take an advantage of the methodology developed by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997, 1999) for the analysis of the zero bound problem and adapted by Lipin´ska (2008) for the
analysis of the monetary criteria. This method enables us to verify whether a given criterion is satised by only
computing rst and second moments of a variable for which the criterion is set.
1Lipin´ska (2008) reports that Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia fail to fulll the CPI ination
rate criterion (see Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A). Moreover, Hungary and Romania also violate the nominal interest rate
criterion (see Figures A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A). Moreover, the nominal exchange rate uctuations of Polish Zloty, Slovakian
Koruna and Romanian Lei versus the euro exceed the band set by the nominal exchange rate criterion (see Figure A.6 in Appendix
A). Additionally, decit to GDP criterion is not satised by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (see Figure A.7 in
Appendix A). Finally, only Hungary is characterised by an excessive debt to GDP ratio according to the limits set by the Maastricht
criteria.
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Under the chosen parameterization (which aims to reect the Czech Republic economy) the optimal monetary
and scal policy violates three Maastricht convergence criteria: on the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest
rate and decit to GDP ratio. Both the stabilization component and deterministic component of the constrained
policy are di¤erent from the unconstrained optimal policy. The constrained policy leads to a smaller variability
of the CPI ination and the nominal interest rate and at the same time higher variability of decit to GDP
ratio. This reects an active stabilization role of scal policy in the presence of direct constraints on monetary
instrument. Moreover, as in Lipin´ska (2008) the constrained policy is characterized by a deationary bias which
results in targeting the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower by 1.3% (in annual terms)
than the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. Importantly,
the constrained policy is also characterized by targeting surplus to GDP ratio at around 3.7%. This result is
determined by a relative dominance of the monetary criteria over the scal ones in a¤ecting the stabilization
process. Accordingly the constrained policymaker uses actively scal instruments and in order to comply with
all the criteria has to assign a relatively high surplus to GDP ratio target. As a result, the policy constrained by
the Maastricht convergence criteria induces additional welfare costs that amount to 60% of the initial deadweight
loss associated with the optimal unconstrained policy. These welfare costs have their origin in conicting interest
of monetary and scal criteria and also relatively poor performance of scal policy as an additional stabilization
tool.
The literature on the macroeconomic policies in the EMU Accession countries concentrated so far on the
analysis of the monetary criteria and their impact on the appropriate choice of the monetary regime. In
particular, Devereux and Lane (2003), Ferreira (2006), Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna
(2007) study this issue in a framework of open economy DSGE models.2
The issue of a proper design of scal policy in the EMU Accession countries has not been studied up till
now. However, theoretical literature addressed already the problem of a joint optimal monetary and scal
policy both in the closed, open economy and monetary union environment. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and Benigno and Woodford (2003) study the design of optimal monetary and scal policy in the closed economy
environment, while Benigno and De Paoli (2006) derive the optimal monetary and scal policy for a small open
economy. These papers nd that variations in scal instruments should serve the same objectives as those
in the optimal monetary policy design, i.e. stabilization of ination and the output gap that measures total
distortion of the level of economic activity. Ferrero (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Pappa and Vassilatos
(2005) are examples of papers that study optimal monetary and scal policy in a monetary union. In particular,
Ferrero (2005) shows that regional scal policies that respond to a measure of real activity perform better in
terms of welfare than balanced budget rules. Gali and Monacelli (2005) nd that the lack of regional monetary
instrument generates a stabilization role for regional scal policies. Interestingly, Pappa and Vassilatos (2006)
examine how general scal rules that are designed to satisfy scal criteria a¤ect macroeconomic stability and
welfare in a two-region monetary union. They nd that some exibility in compliance with scal criteria can
be welfare improving.
We take advantage of these theoretical studies and characterize an optimal monetary and scal policy mix
in a model which tries to reect some of the characteristics of the EMU Accession countries. Then we analyze
the e¤ects of the Maastricht criteria on the optimal policies. In that way we can set guidelines on the way
monetary and scal policy should be conducted in the EMU Accession countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the model. Section 3 explains
2Lipin´ska (2008) provides a detailed discussion of both empirical and theoretical papers on the monetary policy in the EMU
Accession Countries.
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derivation of the optimal monetary and scal policy. Section 4 presents the way we reformulate the Maastricht
convergence criteria in order to implement them into our framework. Section 5 is dedicated to derivation of
the optimal policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria. Section 6 compares the unconstrained
optimal monetary and scal policy with the optimal monetary and scal policy constrained by the Maastricht
convergence criteria under the chosen parameterization of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Our modelling framework is based on a two-sector SOE model of Lipin´ska (2008) and one-sector SOE models of
De Paoli (2004) and Benigno and De Paoli (2006). Following De Paoli (2004), we model a small open economy
as the limiting case of a two-country problem, i.e. where the size of the small open economy is set to zero. We
consider two highly integrated economies where asset markets are complete. In each of the economies, there
are two goods sectors: nontraded goods and traded goods. Each of the sectors (domestic and foreign) features
heterogeneity of goods and monopolistic competition. Labour is the only factor of production and is mobile
between sectors in each country and immobile between countries. We assume the existence of home bias in
consumption which, in turn, depends on the relative size of the economy and its degree of openness. Although
the law of one price holds, existence of home bias leads to deviations from the purchasing power parity.
As far as the monetary and scal policy is concerned we follow Benigno andWoodford (2003) and Benigno and
De Paoli (2006) and assume that the policies are conducted in a fully coordinated way by a single policymaker.
The role for monetary policy arises through the introduction of monopolistic competition and price rigidities
with staggered Calvo contracts in all goods sectors. The model features complete pass-through as prices are set
in the producers currency. We abstract from any monetary frictions by assuming cashless limiting economies.3
The scal policy issues a one period nominal non-state contingent debt which is nanced only through the
distortionary revenue taxes collected in both domestic sectors. On the contrary to Lipin´ska (2008) the lump
sum taxes are not available.
Finally, the stochastic environment of the small open economy is characterized by asymmetric productivity
shocks originating in both domestic sectors, preference shocks, foreign consumption shocks and government
expenditure shocks.
2.1 Households
The world economy consists of a continuum of agents of unit mass: [0; n) belonging to a small country (home)
and [n; 1] belonging to the rest of the world, i.e. the euro area (foreign). There are two types of di¤erentiated
goods produced in each country: traded and nontraded goods. Home traded goods are indexed on the interval
[0; n) and foreign traded goods on the interval [n; 1], respectively. The same applies to nontraded goods. In
order to simplify the exposition of the model, we explain in detail only the structure and dynamics of the
domestic economy. Thus, from now on, we assume the size of the domestic economy to be zero, i.e. n! 0.
Households are assumed to live innitely and behave according to the permanent income hypothesis. They
can choose between three types of goods: nontraded, domestic traded and foreign traded goods. Cit represents
consumption at period t of a consumer i and Lit constitutes his labour supply. Each agent i maximizes the
following utility function:4
3See Woodford (2003).
4 In general, we assume U to be twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in Ct and V to be twice di¤erentiable, increasing
and convex in Lt.
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maxEt0
( 1X
t=t0
t t0

U
 
Cit ; Bt
  V  Lit
)
; (1)
where Et0 denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t0,  is the intertemporal discount
factor and 0 <  < 1; U() stands for ows of utility from consumption and V () represents ows of disutility from
supplying labour.5 C is a composite consumption index. We dene consumerspreferences over the composite
consumption index Ct of traded goods (CT;t) (domestically produced and foreign ones) and nontraded goods
(CN;t):
Ct 


1
C
 1

N;t + (1  )
1
C
 1

T;t
 
 1
; (2)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and  2 [0; 1] is the share
of the nontraded goods in overall consumption. Traded good consumption is a composite of the domestically
produced traded goods (CH) and foreign produced traded goods (CF ):
CT;t 
h
(1  ) 1C
 1

H;t + 
1
C
 1

F;t
i 
 1
; (3)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home traded and foreign traded goods, and  is the degree of
openness of the small open economy ( 2 [0; 1]).6 Finally, Cj (where j = N; H; F ) are consumption sub-indices
of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods:
Cj;t 
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
ct (j)
 1
 dj
35  1 ; (4)
where  > 1 represents elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods in each of the sectors. Based on
the above presented preferences, we derive consumption-based price indices expressed in the units of currency
of the domestic country:
Pt 
h
P 1 N;t + (1  )P 1 T;t
i 1
1 
; (5)
PT;t 
h
P 1 H;t + (1  )P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
(6)
with
Pj;t 
24 1
n
 nZ
0
pt (j)
1 
dj
35 11  : (7)
5We assume specic functional forms of consumption utility U
 
Cit

, and disutility from labour V
 
Lit

: U
 
Cit
  (Cit)1 Bt
1  ;
V
 
Lit
  'l (Lit)1+1+ with  ( > 0), the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and  (  0), the
inverse of labour supply elasticity and Bt ; preference shock.
6Following de Paoli (2004) and Sutherland (2002), we assume home bias () of the domestic households to be a function of the
relative size of the home economy with respect to the foreign one (n) and its degree of openness () such that (1  ) = (1  n)
where  2 [0; 1]: Importantly, the higher is the degree of openness, the smaller is the degree of home bias. Since n! 0, we obtain
that  = 1  :
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Although we assume the law of one price in the traded sector (i.e. p(h) = Sp(h) and p(f) = Sp(f) where
S is the nominal exchange rate), both the existence of the nontraded goods and the assumed home bias cause
deviations from purchasing power parity, i.e. P 6= SP . The real exchange rate can be dened in the following
manner: RS  SPP : Moreover, we dene the international terms of trade as T  PFPH and the ratio of nontraded
to traded goodsprices (domestic terms of trade) as T d  PNPT :
From consumer preferences, we can derive total demand for the generic goods n (home nontraded ones),
h (home traded ones), f (foreign traded ones):
yd(n) =

p(n)
PN
  
PN
P
 
(C +G); (8)
yd(h) =

p(h)
PH
  
PH
PT
 
(1  )(CT +GT ) +

p(h)
P H
  
P H
P T
 
(CT +G

T ); (9)
yd(f) =

p(f)
P F
  
P F
P T
 
(CT +G

T ) (10)
where variables with an asterisk represent the foreign equivalents of the domestic variables. Moreover, G
and G denote exogenous aggregate government expenditures which have the same composition as the private
consumption. Accordingly, GT and GT denote government expenditure in the tradable sector. Importantly,
since the domestic economy is a small open economy, demand for foreign traded goods does not depend on
domestic demand. However, at the same time, demand for domestic traded goods depends on foreign demand.
Households get disutility from supplying labour to all rms present in each country. Each individual supplies
labour to both sectors, i.e. the traded and the nontraded sector:
Lit = L
i;H
t + L
i;N
t : (11)
We assume that consumers have access to a complete set of securities-contingent claims traded internation-
ally. Each household faces the following budget constraint:
PtC
i
t + EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt +W iH;tLiH;t +W iN;tLiN;t +
nR
0
iN;tdi
n
+
nR
0
iH;tdi
n
; (12)
where at date t, Dt+1 is nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held at the end of period (t), Qt;t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo¤s relevant to the domestic household, H;t and N;t are
nominal prots from the domestic rms. Moreover, consumers face no Ponzi game restriction.
The short-term interest rate (Rt) is dened as the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of currency
in each contingency that occurs in the next period:7
R 1t = EtfQt;t+1g: (13)
The maximization problem of any household consists of maximizing the discounted stream of utility (1)
subject to the budget constraint (12) in order to determine the optimal path of the consumption index, the
labour index and contingent claims at all times. The solution to the household decision problem gives a set
7Following the literature, we assume one period to be one quarter.
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of rst-order conditions.8 Optimization of the portfolio holdings leads to the following Euler equations for the
domestic economy:
UC(Ct; Bt) = Et

UC(Ct+1; Bt+1)Q
 1
t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

: (14)
There is a perfect sharing in this setting, meaning that marginal rates of consumption in nominal terms are
equalized between countries in all states and at all times.9 Subsequently, appropriately choosing the distribution
of initial wealth, we obtain the risk sharing condition:
UC(Ct; Bt)
UC(Ct ; Bt )
= 
Pt
StP t
= RS 1t ; (15)
where  > 0 and depends on the initial wealth distribution. The risk sharing condition implies that the real
exchange rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption.
The optimality condition for labour supply in the domestic economy is the following:
W kt
Pt
=
VL(Lt)
UC(Ct; Bt)
; (16)
where W k is the nominal wage of the representative consumer in sector k (k = H;N):10 So the real wage is
equal to the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption.
2.2 Firms
All rms are owned by consumers. Both traded and nontraded sectors are monopolistically competitive. The
production function is linear in labour which is the only input. Consequently, its functional form for rm i in
sector k (k = N; H) is the following:
Yk;t(i) = A
k
tL
k
t (i): (17)
Price is set according to the Calvo (1983) pricing scheme. In each period, a fraction of rms (1 k) decides
its price, thus maximizing the future expected prots. The maximization problem of any rm in sector k at
time t0 is given by:
max
Pk;t0 (i)
Et0
1X
t=to
(k)
sQt0;t

(1  kR;t)Pk;t0(i) MCkt (i)

Y dk;t0:t(i)
subject to Y dk;t0:t(i) =

Pk;t0(i)
Pk;t
 
Yk;t; (18)
where Y dk;t0:t(i) is demand for the individual good in sector k produced by producer i at time t conditional on
keeping the price Pk;t0(i) xed at the level chosen at time t0; MC
k
t =
Wkt (i)
Akt
is the nominal marginal cost in
sector k at time t, and k;t are revenue taxes in sector k.
8We here suppress subscript i as we assume that in equilibrium, all agents are identical. Therefore, we represent optimality
conditions for a representative agent.
9We have to point out here that although the assumption of complete markets conveniently simplies the model, it neglects a
possibility of wealth e¤ects in response to di¤erent shocks (Benigno (2001)).
10Notice that wages are equalized between sectors inside each of the economies, due to perfect labour mobility and perfect
competition in the labour market.
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Given this setup, the price index in sector k evolves according to the following law of motion:
(Pk;t)
1  = k(Pk;t 1)1  + (1  k)(Pk;t0(i))1 : (19)
2.3 Government budget constraint
The government issues a nominal, non-state contingent debt denominated in domestic currency and taxes the
revenue income of rms in the nontraded sector at rate N;t and also in the home traded sector at rate H;t:
The revenues are spent on government expenditures (Gt) and interest payments on outstanding nominal debt.
We assume that there are no seigniorage revenues.
Government debt, Dt, expressed in nominal terms, follows the law of motion:
Dt = Rt 1Dt 1   Ptsrt (20)
where srt is the real primary budget surplus:
srt = N;tpN;tYN;t + H;tpH;tYH;t  Gt (21)
and pN;t  PN;tPt and pH;t 
PH;t
Pt
denote relative prices. We dene:
dt  DtRt
Pt
(22)
in order to rewrite the government budget constraint as:
dt = dt 1
Rt
t
 Rtsrt: (23)
The rational-expectations equilibrium requires that the expected path of government surpluses must satisfy
an intertemporal solvency condition :
dt0 1
t0
UC(Ct0 ; Bt0) = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0UC(Ct; Bt)srt: (24)
in each state of the world that may be realized at date t0: This condition restricts the possible paths that
may be chosen for the tax rates fN;t; H;tg : Moreover, monetary policy can a¤ect this condition by inuencing
ination in period t0 and also a¤ecting the discount factors in subsequent periods. This condition is derived
from the household optimization condition (14) and law of motion of debt (23). As discussed in Woodford (2001)
this condition serves as one of the constraints in choosing an optimal plan among possible rational-expectations
equilibria.
2.4 Monetary and scal policy
A role for the macroeconomic policy arises due to existing nominal and real rigidities in the economy: price
stickiness (together with monopolistic competition), home bias and the nontraded good sector, which lead to
deviations from PPP. The policy maker has three instruments: two scal ones - revenue tax rates in both
domestic sectors and a monetary one - nominal interest rate. The system is therefore closed by dening
appropriate monetary and scal policy rules for the domestic economy.
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We approximate the model around a steady state in which exogenous shocks take constant values. Moreover
steady state ination is zero and tax rates are chosen in such a way in order to maximize welfare of the agents.
The loglinearized version of the model is available in the Appendix.
3 The optimal scal and monetary policy
Since our model is microfounded the optimal policy is dened as the policy that maximizes welfare of society
subject to the structural equations of an economy.
We use a linear quadratic approach (Rotemberg andWoodford (1997, 1999)) and dene the optimal monetary
policy problem as a minimization problem of the quadratic loss function subject to the loglinearized structural
equations (presented in the Appendix). First, we present the welfare measure derived through a second-order
Taylor approximation of equation (1):
Wt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0vbvt   12bv0tZvbvt   bv0tZbt] + tip+O(3); (25)
where bv0t = h bCt bYN;t bYH;t bN;t bH;t i ; b0t = h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt bGt i ;
z0v =
h
1  sCYN  sCYH 0 0
i
with sCYN  !YNC - steady state share of nontraded labour income in
domestic consumption, sCYH  wYHC - steady state share of home traded labour income in domestic consumption,
and matrices Zv; Z are dened in Appendix B; tip stands for terms independent of policy and O(3) includes
terms that are of a higher order than the second in the deviations of variables from their steady state values.
Notice that the welfare measure (25) contains the linear terms in aggregate consumption and sector outputs.
These linear terms originate from di¤erent distortions in the economy. First, monopolistic competition together
with distortionary revenue taxes in both domestic sectors lead to ine¢ cient levels of sector outputs and also an
ine¢ cient level of aggregate output. Second, since government spends its revenues on government expenditures
domestic consumption and aggregate output are not equalized. Third, openness of the economy can also result
in trade imbalances, i.e. domestic consumption can be di¤erent from the aggregate output. Importantly, their
composition depends on the domestic and international terms of trade. Finally, similarly to De Paoli (2007)
and Lipinska (2008) there exists an international terms of trade externality that creates an incentive for policy
to generate a welfare improving real exchange rate appreciation, i.e. disutility from labour decreases without
an accompanying decrease in the utility of consumption.
The presence of linear terms in the welfare measure (25) means that we cannot determine the optimal policy,
up to rst order, using the welfare measure subject to the structural equations (presented in the Appendix)
that are only accurate to rst order. Following the method proposed by Benigno and Woodford (2005) and
Benigno and Benigno (2005), we substitute the linear terms in the approximated welfare function (25) by using
a second order approximation to some of the structural conditions.11 As a result, we obtain the fully quadratic
loss function which can be represented as a function of aggregate output (bYt), domestic and international terms
of trade (bT dt ; bTt), domestic sector ination rates (bH;t; bN;t) and revenue tax rates in the nontraded and home
traded sector (bN;t; bH;t). Its general expression is given below:
11Details of the derivation can be found in Appendix B.
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minLt0 = UCC
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
y(bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12Td( bT dt   bT dTt )2 + 12T ( bTt   bTTt )2 + (26)
1
2
N (bN;t   bTN;t)2 + 12H (bH;t   bTH;t)2 +Y Td bYt bT dt +Y T bYt bTt +TdT bT dt bTt + (27)
+bN;t(Y N bYt +TN bTt +TdN bT dt ) + bH;t(Y H bYt +TH bTt +TdH bT dt ) + (28)
+
1
2
N b2N;t + 12Hb2H;t] + tip+O(3) (29)
where bY Tt ; bT dTt ; bTTt ; bTN;t; bTH;t are target variables which are functions of the stochastic shocks and, in general,
are di¤erent from the exible price equilibrium processes of aggregate output, domestic terms of trade and
international terms of trade.12 The term tip stands for terms independent of policy. The coe¢ cients Y ; Td ;
T ; N ; H ; TTd ; Y Td ; Y T ; H ; N ; Y N ; TN ; TdN ; Y H ; TH ; TdH ; are functions of the
structural parameters of the model.
Similarly to Lipin´ska (2008) our loss function generalizes previous studies regarding optimal monetary policy
characterization in both closed economy environments (Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004), Rotemberg and Wood-
ford(1997)) and open economy environments (Gali and Monacelli (2005), De Paoli (2007)). Moreover this loss
function is also related to the literature on optimal monetary and scal policy in the sticky price environment
(Benigno and Woodford (2003), Benigno and De Paoli (2007), Schmitt - Grohe and Uribe (2003)). As in Be-
nigno and Woodford (2003) and Benigno and De Paoli (2007) we obtain that variations in distortionary taxation
should be chosen to serve the same objectives as those emphasized in the literature on monetary stabilization
policy. Interestingly, our loss function also involves some stabilization of taxes.13
To simplify the exposition of the optimal plan we reduce number of variables to a set of eight domestic
variables which determine the loss function (26), i.e. bYt; bT dt ; bTt; bH;t; bN;t; bN;t; bH;t; bdt: In Appendix we
present the structural equations of the two-sector small open closed economy in terms of these variables. Finally,
the policy maker following the optimal plan under commitment chooses fbYt; bT dt ; bTt; bH;t; bN;t;bN;t;bH;t; bdtg1t=t0
in order to minimize the loss function (26) subject to the constraints (237)(241), given the initial conditions
on nonpredetermined variables: bYt0 ; bT dt0 ; bTt0 ; bH;t0 ; bN;t0 ;bN;t0 ;bH;t0 ; bdt0 . In accordance with the denition of
the optimal plan from a timeless perspective (see Woodford (2003), p.538) we derive the rst-order conditions
of the problem for all t  t0(we present them in Appendix in order not to overload the main text, see equations
(244)(255)). Equations that represent rst order conditions (244)(255) and constraints (237)(241) fully
characterize behaviour of the economy under the optimal policy.
4 The Maastricht convergence criteria a reinterpretation
The Maastricht convergence criteria have a nonlinear nature as they set specic bounds on both monetary and
scal variables. Subsequently, derivation of the optimal policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria would
involve solving a nonlinear optimization problem that requires computationally demanding techniques. On
the other hand, as already emphasized by Lipin´ska (2008) the linear quadratic approach has two important
12As previously shown in papers by Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2007), in the small open economy framework the
target variables will be identical to the exible price allocations only in some special cases, i.e. an e¢ cient steady state, no markup
shocks, no expenditure switching e¤ect (i.e.  = 1) and no trade imbalances. Moreover, as shown by Benigno and Woodford
(2003) a non-zero steady state share of government expenditures in output a¤ects the target variables.
13As it is going to be seen in our numerical analysis, this stabilisation feature is insignicant in quantitative terms.
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advantages: an analytical and intuitive expression for the loss function and also easy to check second-order
conditions for local optimality of the derived policy. As a result, following Lipin´ska (2008) we reformulate the
Maastricht criteria in order to introduce them as additional constraints faced by the optimal policy in the linear
quadratic approach.
We consider three monetary criteria regarding CPI ination rate, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange
rate and also one scal criterion that sets an upper bound on decit to GDP. We neglect the debt to GDP
criterion as almost all the EMU accession countries are characterized by moderate debt to GDP ratios (see
Figure (10.2)) that are smaller than the upper limit of 60% quoted in the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover,
in the past failure in compliance with debt to GDP criterion (on the contrary to the decit to GDP criterion)
was not treated as an obstacle to enter to the EMU (e.g. case of Belgium or Italy). This is in accordance with
the stipulates of the Maastricht Treaty Article (see Appendix).
Subsequently, we summarize the criteria (described in the introduction) by the following inequalities:
 CPI aggregate ination criterion
At   A;t  B; (30)
where B = 1:5%; At is annual CPI aggregate ination in the domestic economy, 
A;
t is the average of
the annual CPI aggregate inations in the three lowest ination countries of the European Union.
 nominal interest rate criterion
RLt  RL;At  CR (31)
where CR = 2%; RLt is the annul interest rate for ten-year government bond in the domestic economy,
RL;At is the average of the annual interest rates for ten-year government bonds in the three countries of
the European Union with the lowest ination rates.
 nominal exchange rate criterion
(1 DS)S  St  (1 +DS)S; (32)
where DS = 15% and S is the central parity between euro and the domestic currency and St is the nominal
exchange rate.
 decit to GDP criterion
dft  Fdf (33)
where Fdf = 3% and dft - annual decit to GDP. In our framework decit is dened as a sum of interest
payments on outstanding debt minus the primary surplus that consists of tax revenues and government
expenditures.
We decide to impose a number of adjustments on the original form of the Maastricht criteria. First, these
adjustments originate from the structure of the model which assumes that there are two countries in the
world and dynamics are explained in quarters.14 As a result, we assume that the variables A;t and R
L;A
t ,
respectively, represent foreign aggregate ination and the foreign nominal interest rate, i.e. bt ; bRt (which are
proxied to be the euro area variables). Subsequently, all the four criteria are reformulated in quarterly terms.
We change appropriately upper bounds regarding the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate, i.e.
B  ((1:015)0:25 1); CR  ((1:02)0:25 1): Additionally, we dene the central parity of the nominal exchange
rate as the steady state value of the nominal exchange rate (S = S). Moreover, taking into account the evidence
14A detailed explanation regarding the reformulation of monetary criteria can be found in Lipinska (2008).
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on the predominance of domestic shocks in the EMU accession countries (see Fidrmuc and Kirhonen (2003))
we assume that foreign economy is in the steady state (i.e. foreign ination and foreign nominal interest rate
(bt ; bRt ) are zero).15
Second, using the method proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and Woodford (2003) we
approximate the Maastricht criteria in order to implement them into the linear quadratic framework. The
authors propose to approximate the zero bound constraint for the nominal interest rate by restricting the mean
of the nominal interest rate to be at least k standard deviations higher than the theoretical lower bound, where
k is a su¢ ciently large number to prevent frequent violation of the original constraint. The main advantage of
this alternative constraint over the original one is that it is much less computationally demanding and it only
requires computation of the rst and second moments of the nominal interest rate.
Similarly to Woodford (2003), we redene the criteria using discounted averages in order to conform with
the welfare measure used in our framework. Let us remark that the average value of any variable (xt) is dened
as the discounted sum of the conditional expectations, i.e.:
bm(xt)  Et0 1X
t=t0
txt: (34)
Accordingly, its variance is dened by:
dvar(xt)  Et0 1X
t=t0
t(xt   bm(xt))2: (35)
Below, we show the reformulated Maastricht convergence criteria.16 Each criterion is presented as a set of
two inequalities:
 CPI aggregate ination criterion:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)  0; (36)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)!2 ; (37)
 nominal interest rate criterion:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)  0 (38)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)!2 (39)
 nominal exchange rate criterion must be decomposed into two systems of the inequalities, i.e. the upper
bound and the lower bound:
15Lipinska (2008) discusses the consequences of relaxing this assumption (e.g. a departure from the steady state of the foreign
economy or a suboptimal foreign monetary policy) for the nature of optimal policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria and the
associated welfare loss.
16The detailed derivation of the Maastricht convergence criteria can be found in Appendix B.
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 upper bound
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)  0 (40)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)!2 (41)
 lower bound
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)  0 (42)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)!2 (43)
 decit to GDP criterion:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(Fdf   bdf t)  0; (44)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(Fdf   bdf t)2  K
 
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(Fdf   bdf t)
!2
; (45)
where K = 1 + k 2 and DS = 15%; B = (1:015)0:25   1; CR = (1:02)0:25   1; Fdf = 3% and k = 1:96:
The rst inequality means that the average values of the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest rate,
the nominal exchange rate and decit to GDP, respectively, should not exceed the bounds, B; CR and DS
and Fdf : The second inequality further restrains uctuations in the Maastricht variables by setting an upper
bound on their variances. This upper bound depends on the average values of the Maastricht variables and the
bounds, B; CR; DS and Fdf . Importantly, it also depends on parameter K which guarantees that the original
constraints on the Maastricht variables ((30)(33)) are satised with a high probability. Under a normality
assumption, by setting K = 1+1:96 2, we obtain that fulllment of inequalities (36)(45) guarantees that each
of the original constraints should be met with a probability of 95%.
Summing up, the set of inequalities (36)(45) represent the Maastricht convergence criteria in our model.
5 Optimal policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria
Following Woodford (2003) and Lipinska (2008) we present the loss function of the optimal policy constrained
by the Maastricht convergence criteria summarized by inequalities (36)(43) (constrained optimal policy). The
loss function of the constrained optimal policy is augmented by the new elements which describe uctuations
in monetary and scal variables, i.e.: CPI aggregate ination, the nominal interest rate, the nominal exchange
rate and decit to GDP ratio.
We state a proposition which can be seen as an extension of the Proposition 1 in Lipin´ska (2008):17
17Both propositions are based on Proposition 6.9 (p.428) in Woodford (2003).
13
Proposition 1 Consider the problem of minimizing an expected discounted sum of quadratic losses:
Et0
(
(1  )
1X
t=t0
tLt
)
; (46)
subject to (36) - (45). Let m1;; m1;R; mU1;S ; m
L
1;S ; m1;df be the discounted average values of (B bt); (CR  bRt);
(DS   bSt); (DS + bSt); (Fdf   bdf t) and m2;; m2;R; mU2;S ; mL2;S ; m2;df be the discounted means of (B   bt)2;
(CR   bRt)2; (DS   bSt)2; (DS + bSt)2; (Fdf + bdf t)2 associated with the optimal policy. Then, the optimal policy
also minimizes a modied discounted loss criterion of the form (46) with Lt replaced by:eLt  Lt +(T   bt)2 +R(RT   bRt)2 +S;U (ST;U   bSt)2 +S;L(ST;L   bSt)2 + 1
2
df (df
T   dft)2; (47)
under constraints represented by the structural equations of an economy. Importantly,   0; R  0;S;U  0;
S;L  0; df  0 and take strictly positive values if and only if the respective constraints (37), (39), (41),
(43), (45) are binding. Moreover, if the constraints are binding, the corresponding target values T ; RT ; ST;U ;
ST;L; dfT satisfy the following relations:
T = B  Km1; < 0 (48)
RT = CR  Km1;R < 0 (49)
ST;U = DS  Km1;S < 0 (50)
ST;L =  DS +Km1;S > 0 (51)
dfT = Fdf  Km1;df < 0: (52)
Proof can be found in Appendix B.
In the presence of binding constraints, the optimal policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria do not only
lead to smaller variances of the Maastricht variables, it also assigns target values for these variables that are
di¤erent from the deterministic steady state of the optimal policy. These targets reect precautionary motive
of the constrained policy.18 In other words, the policy maker needs a bu¤er when it faces inequality constraints.
As in Lipin´ska (2008) if the monetary constraints on the CPI ination or the nominal interest rate are binding,
the constrained policy maker sets targets on these variables that are lower than their foreign equivalents. As
far as the nominal exchange rate is concerned, depending on which: appreciation or depreciation constraint
is binding, constrained policy maker will target, respectively, a more depreciated or more appreciated nominal
exchange rate. Finally, when decit to GDP criterion is binding, the constrained policy maker will target surplus
to GDP.
6 Numerical exercise
This section characterizes the optimal monetary and scal policy for the economy bound to satisfy the Maastricht
convergence criteria. First, we characterize the unconstrained optimal monetary and scal policy and control
whether such a policy violates any of the Maastricht convergence criteria. Second, we characterize the optimal
policy which is only constrained by monetary criteria or scal criterion. We analyze how the loss functions are
augmented and also the stabilization pattern of the constrained policies. Finally, we describe the optimal policy
constrained by all the criteria. We identify which criteria are in quantitative terms important in shaping the
constrained policy and also compare the welfare losses among the constrained and unconstrained policy.
18Similarly, Woodford (2003) shows that a policy maker constrained by the zero bound on the nominal interest rate targets a
positive rate of the nominal interest rate.
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6.1 Parameterization
Our calibration follows to a great extent the previous analysis by Lipin´ska (2008) and also literature on the
EMU accession countries (i.e. Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2007)). We calibrate the
model to match the moments of the variables for the Czech Republic economy.
The discount factor, , equals 0.99, which implies an annual interest rate of around four percent. The
coe¢ cient of risk aversion in consumer preferences is set to 2 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995) to get an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5. Inverse of the labour supply elasticity () is chosen to be
4 following the micro data evidence and also a small open economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2003). The
elasticity of substitution between nontradable and tradable consumption, , is set to 0.5 as in Stockman and
Tesar (1994) and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable consumption, , is set to 1.5
(as in Chari et al. (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2004)). The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated
goods, , is equal to 10, which together with the revenue tax of 0.1919 implies a markup of 1.37.20
The share of nontradable consumption in the aggregate consumption basket, , is assumed to be 0.42, while
the share of foreign tradable consumption in the tradable consumption basket, , is assumed to be 0.4. These
values correspond to the weights in CPI reported for the Czech Republic over the period 20002005.21 The
steady state shares of the government expenditure to GDP (dG) and also debt to GDP (bD) correspond to the
average values for the Czech republic economy over the period 1995-2006 and are set to 0.2 and 1.6 respectively.
As far as the foreign economy is concerned, we set the share of nontradable consumption in the foreign aggregate
consumption basket, , to be 0.6, which is consistent with the value chosen by Benigno and Thoenisen (2003)
regarding the structure of euro area consumption. Finally, the steady state share of debt to GDP in the foreign
economy is assumed to be 2.4 which reects an average debt to GDP ratio in the euro area for the period
1995-2005. Taking government expenditure to GDP and debt to GDP shares as given we obtain that the steady
state revenue tax rate should be 19,3%.22
Following Natalucci and Ravenna (2007), we set the degree of price rigidity in the nontraded sector, N , to
0.85. The degree of price rigidity in the traded sector, H , is slightly smaller and equals 0.8. These values are
somewhat higher than the values reported in the micro and macro studies for the euro area countries.23 Still,
Natalucci and Ravenna (2007) justify them by a high share of the government regulated prices in the EMU
accession countries.
All shocks that constitute the stochastic environment of the small open economy follow the AR(1) process.
The parameters of the shocks are chosen to match the historical moments of the variables (see Table B.3 in
Appendix B). Similarly to Natalucci and Ravenna (2007) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003), the productivity shocks
in both domestic sectors are characterized by a strong persistence parameter equal to 0.85. Standard deviations
of the productivity shocks are set to 1.6% (nontraded sector) and 1.8% (traded sector). These values roughly
19This value is calculated from the steady state budget constraint. Debt to GDP and steady state share of government expendi-
tures to GDP are taken from the data on the Czech Republic economy.
20Martins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup for manufacturing sectors at around 1.2 in most OECD countries over the
period 1980-1992. Some studies (Morrison (1994), Domowitz et al (1988)) suggest that the plausible estimates range between 1.2
and 1.7.
21Source: Eurostat.
22Note that the steady state which we present in the numerical exercise and in the Appendix di¤ers from the steady state used
for calibration in two aspects: revenue tax rates can di¤er between the domestic sectors and are chosen in order to maximize welfare
of the domestic consumers.
23Stahl (2004) estimates that the average duration between price adjustment in the manufacturing sector is nine months (which
corresponds to the degree of price rigidity: 0.67). On the other hand, Gali et al (2001) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2003)
estimate the aggregate supply relations for the European countries and nd the overall degree of price rigidity for these countries
to be 0.78.
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reect the values chosen by Natalucci and Ravenna (2007), 1.8% (nontraded sector) and 2% (traded sector).
Moreover, the productivity shocks are strongly correlated, their correlation coe¢ cient is set to 0.7.24 All other
shocks are independent of each other. Parameters dening the preference shock are, 0.72% (standard deviation)
and 0.95 (persistence parameter). These values are similar to the values chosen by Laxton and Pesenti (2003),
0.4% (standard deviation) and 0.7 (persistence parameter). Parameters of the foreign consumption shock are
estimated using quarterly data on aggregate consumption in the euro area over the period 1990-2005 (source:
Eurostat). The standard deviation of the foreign consumption shock is equal to 0.23% and its persistence
parameter is 0.85. Similarly, parameters of the domestic government expenditure shock are estimated based on
quarterly data on the nal consumption of general government in the Czech Republic over the period 1995-2006.
The standard deviation of the domestic government expenditure shock is equal 2% and its persistence parameter
is 0.5.
Following Natalucci and Ravenna (2007), we parametrize the monetary policy rule, i.e. the nominal interest
rate follows the rule described by: bRt = 0:9 bRt 1 + 0:1(bt + 0:2bYt + 0:3bSt) + b"R;t; where b"R;t is the monetary
policy innovation with a standard deviation equal to 0.44%. Such a parametrization of the monetary policy
rule enables us to closely match the historical moments of the Czech economy. As far as the scal policy is
concerned, we choose a scal rule described in Duarte and Wolman (2003). The rule takes a form of tax rate
adjustment to debt to GDP dynamics:  t =  t 1 + b; (bt   b) + b; (bt   bt 1). Parameters of the rule are
taken from Mitchell et al (2002) and are set to b; = 0:04=16; b; = 0:3=4:
We summarize all parameters described above in Table B.1 (Structural parameters) and Table B.2 (Stochastic
environment) in Appendix B. Moreover Table 3 (Matching the moments) in Appendix B compares the model
moments with the historical moments for the Czech Republic economy.
6.2 The unconstrained optimal policy
The optimal monetary and scal policy is characterized around the optimal steady state. The optimal steady
state is dened as a steady state in which revenue taxes in all the sectors are chosen to maximize welfare of the
economies given exogenous share of government expenditure to GDP and debt to GDP. The optimal tax rates
in the domestic sectors are equal respectively, in the nontraded sector: N =  0:38 and in the home traded
sector: H = 0:57: The implied tax base (total tax revenue to GDP ratio) is equal to 21%.
As in Lipin´ska (2008) we obtain that the highest penalty coe¢ cient is assigned to uctuations in the nontrad-
able sector ination and home tradable ination (see Table 1). The optimal monetary and scal policy is mainly
concerned with stabilization of the domestic ination, which is in line with core ination targeting argument
(Aoki (2001)) and also literature on the optimal monetary and scal policy (e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2003),
Benigno and De Paoli (2006)). Moreover, the policy faces also trade-o¤s between stabilizing the output gap and
sector ination which is reected in the positive values of the penalty coe¢ cients associated with uctuations
of domestic and international terms of trade.
Similarly to the previous literature on optimal taxation (among others Barro (1979), Aiyagari et al (2002),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Benigno and Woodford (2003)) we nd that the optimal policy does not
stabilize taxes and debt which implies their nonstationary behaviour. We decide to induce stationarity into the
model in order to be able to characterize properly the constrained policy. As already analyzed by Woodford
(2003) and Lipin´ska (2008), the constrained policy is characterized by two components: stabilization one (a
coe¢ cient that penalizes uctuations of a variable of interest) and deterministic one (a target value for a
variable of interest). While the stabilization component a¤ects the way policy responds to the shocks, the
24Empirical evidence shows that productivity shocks are highly persistent and positively correlated (see Backus et al (1992)).
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deterministic component a¤ects the steady state of the optimal policy and therefore also discounted means of
the variables. Importantly, due to the nonstationarity of debt and taxes the steady state of the policy would not
exist. In order to induce stationarity we add a new element to the original loss function which penalizes debt
uctuations.25 Value of the coe¢ cient (d) is chosen to be quantitatively small in order not to a¤ect dynamics
of the model, i.e. d = 10
 4:26
Table 1: Values of the loss function coe¢ cients
N H Y Td T TTd Y Td Y T
123.14 35.29 4.26 0.2 0.17 0.02 -0.58 -0.32
In order to understand nature of the optimal policy we investigate how the optimal policy responds to the
shocks. Based on variance decomposition of the Maastricht variables (presented in Table 2) we choose to analyze
the impulse responses to a nontraded productivity shock.
Table 2: Variance decomposition under the unconstrained policy
shocks:
The Maastricht variables: AN AH B C G
CPI ination 86% 4% 5% 2% 3%
nominal interest rate 87% 4% 1% 1% 7%
nominal exchange rate 79% 3% 15% 2% 1%
decit to GDP 70% 1% 20% 1% 10%
debt to GDP 74% 1% 21% 1% 3%
Similarly to Lipin´ska (2008), monetary instrument of the optimal policy - the nominal interest rate decreases
in response to a positive nontraded productivity shock. This stabilizes the deationary pressures in the domestic
nontraded sector and at the same time supports increase in aggregate output. As a result, the nominal exchange
rate depreciates (in accordance with the uncovered interest rate parity condition). Interestingly, scal component
of the policy is characterized by a countercyclical behaviour. Such a behaviour of taxes has its origin in a specic
structure of the economy, i.e. openness and two domestic sectors. First of all, as already studied by Benigno
and De Paoli (2006) an open economy nature of the economy gives the optimal policy maker an incentive to use
taxes in the countercyclical way thanks to existence of terms of trade externality.27 By setting higher taxes in
the sector where the shock occurred the optimal policy maker can engineer a welfare-improving real exchange
rate appreciation. Secondly, two sector structure creates important trade-o¤s for the optimal policy maker.
This trade-o¤ was already studied by Gali and Monacelli (2005) in a model of monetary union, where monetary
and scal policy are set optimally under full coordination. In their model, each countrys scal authority faces
a trade-o¤ between stabilization of domestic ination as opposed to output and scal gap. Since the cost of
ination is higher than of the changes in distortionary taxation the optimal policy maker allows for uctuations
in the scal instruments.28 As a result, in our model revenue taxes in the nontraded sector rise in order to
25This additional element is a bit ad-hoc although it is motivated by an idea of model stationarization by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003). Alternatively, if one assumes that government debt is denominated in foreign currencies introduction of portfolio
adjustment costs (presented by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)) would also stationarize the model.
26For the purposes of sensitivity analysis we also present the results for d = 10
 5 and also for the unconstrained policy d = 0:
27This incentive is present under an assumption of the substitutability between home and foreign goods.
28Notice however that on the contrary to our model Gali and Monacelli (2005) study a demand side scal instrument, i.e.
government expenditures.
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stabilize the nontraded output and deation in the nontraded sector. At the same time, revenue taxes in the
home traded sector decrease to stabilize the home traded output and inationary pressures in this sector.
Consequently, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) domestic ination stabilizes. Moreover, output increases in
both domestic sectors. Finally, since the overall tax revenues rise decit to GDP and debt to GDP decrease.
[Figure(1) about here]
Let us investigate now which Maastricht criteria are not satised by the optimal policy. Under the optimal
policy means of all the variables are zero so the reinterpreted Maastricht criteria can be reduced to the constraints
that set upper bounds on the variances of the Maastricht variables, i.e.:
dvar(bt)  (K   1)B2 (53)
dvar( bRt)  (K   1)C2R (54)
dvar(bSt)  (K   1)D2S (55)
dvar( bdf t)  (K   1)F 2df (56)
wheredvar(xt) with xt = bt; bRt; bSt; bdf t is dened by (35).
In the table below (Table 3) we present the variances of the Maastricht variables together with the upper
bounds implied by the Maastricht criteria. We also show variance of debt to GDP and a respective bound
for this variables in accordance with the limit set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Let us note that although
variances of debt and decit to GDP ratio do depend on the chosen value of the coe¢ cient d variances of other
Maastricht variables do not.
Table 3: Variances of the Maastricht variables under optimal policy
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
0 0.5808 0.4173 22.3785 4.1889 2392.8873
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 4 0.5808 0.4088 22.8337 3.3054 702.2339
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 5 0.5808 0.4156 22.5169 4.0013 1758.4676
bound 0.0356 0.0651 58.5693 2.3428 650.7705
probability29 0.69 0.78 1 0.92 0.99
criterion violated violated satisfied violated satisfied30
note: Variances and bounds are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
29Since debt follows a near nonstationary and also very persistent process we perform a Monte Carlo simulation exercise in which
we simulate our model for T = 50 periods and repeat this simulation J = 1000 times. Based on this, we can calculate the average
probabilities, for each of the Maastricht variables, of compliance with the criteria. We assume that a given criterion is not satised
if the probability for a given variable is lower than 95% (which is in accordance with the parameter k).
30 satised on the basis of the value of the simulated average probability.
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The optimal unconstrained policy does not satisfy three of the Maastricht criteria: the CPI ination criterion,
the nominal interest rate criterion and the decit to GDP criterion. As a result, the loss function of optimal
policy that satises the Maastricht criteria has to have some additional elements.
6.3 The constrained optimal policy
6.3.1 The optimal policy constrained by monetary criteria
Now we analyze the policy constrained only by monetary criteria: CPI ination rate and the nominal interest
rate. In particular, we examine whether in the presence of the monetary criteria scal policy can act as an
additional stabilization tool.
First, we present parameters of the loss function associated with this constrained policy. The loss function
takes the following form:
eLmt = Lst + 12(T   bt)2 + 12R(RT   bRt)2 (57)
where  > 0; R > 0 and 
T < 0; RT < 0: Similarly to the policy constrained only by the scal criterion,
values of parameters (; R; 
T ; RT ) can be obtained from the solution to the minimization problem of the loss
function Lst constrained by structural equations and also the monetary constraints. Table 4 provides the specic
values for all the parameters for two di¤erent values of the penalty coe¢ cient on debt uctuations. It appears
that values of the parameters of the constrained policy by monetary criteria do not depend to a great extent
on the degree of debt stabilization (d). Importantly, values of the penalty coe¢ cients on the nominal interest
rate and CPI ination rate are of the same magnitude as the penalty coe¢ cients of the domestic ination rates
in the original loss function. Deterministic component of the constrained policy tells us that the policy maker
constrained by monetary criteria should target CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are 0:8%
p:a: lower than in the countries of reference.
Table 4: The policy constrained by monetary criteria
Parameters of the augmented loss function
d  R 
T (in %) RT (in %)
10 4 36 31.1 -0.2082 -0.2331
10 5 35.62 31.12 -0.2005 -0.2250
Second, we show moments of the Maastricht variables under the policy constrained by monetary criteria (see
Table 5). As far as discounted means are concerned, negative targets of the CPI ination rate and the nominal
interest rate lead to negative means in all the Maastricht variables, except for the mean of debt to GDP. A
higher mean of debt to GDP results from a higher mean of surplus to GDP and higher means of revenue taxes
(to be seen later in the analysis of the impulse responses). Variances of the nominal variables: CPI ination rate,
the nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate are lower than under the optimal unconstrained policy.
However, this smaller variability of nominal variables is accompanied by much higher variability of the scal
variables: decit to GDP and debt to GDP. Compliance with monetary criteria restricts usage of the nominal
interest rate as a stabilization tool and requires stronger movements in taxes. These scal instruments have a
direct impact on domestic ination rates and also dampen changes in the aggregate output when responding
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to shocks. Subsequently, surplus to GDP is characterized by much higher variance and so does decit to GDP
and debt to GDP.
Table 5: Moments of the Maastricht variables
The policy constrained by monetary criteria
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 4 mean (in %) -0.0667 -0.0688 -6.5996 -0.0969 1.5020
variance 0.0836 0.0501 15.7296 15.9482 1419.7149
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 5 mean (in %) -0.0641 -0.0662 -6.3404 -0.0760 2.5511
variance 0.0828 0.0495 15.2364 17.1314 3137.7899
criterion satisfied satisfied satisfied violated violated
note: Variances are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
Third, we analyze how the policy constrained by monetary criteria di¤ers from the optimal unconstrained
policy in the stabilization process of an economy hit by a shock. We choose the shock that explains the most
of variability of the Maastricht variables (see Table 2 on variance decomposition).
[Figure(3) about here]
The policy constrained by monetary criteria aims at stabilizing CPI ination and restricts the nominal
interest rate movements. Accordingly, the monetary policy increases nominal interest rate on impact. Thanks
to this, nominal exchange rate depreciates by less dampening the inationary impact of the import sector on the
aggregate CPI. However such a contractionary behaviour of the monetary policy leads to stronger deationary
pressures in the domestic sector. The domestic deation is partly stabilized by the scal component of the
constrained policy which is more countercyclical than the unconstrained policy, i.e. revenue taxes rise in both
domestic sectors. This leads to a much stronger decrease in decit to GDP, debt to GDP and also dampened
increase in domestic aggregate output in comparison with the unconstrained policy.
6.3.2 The optimal policy constrained by scal criterion
Let us now present the constrained policy by the scal criterion: decit to GDP criterion. We concentrate on
how the scal criteria a¤ect the ability of scal policy to stabilize business cycle uctuations. The loss function
of the policy constrained by the decit to GDP criterion can be represented in the following way:
eLft = Lst + 12df (dfT   dft)2 (58)
where Lst = Lt + d bdt and df > 0 and dfT < 0: The solution to the minimization problem of the loss
function Lst constrained by structural equations and also the constraint on decit to GDP gives us values for
the parameters df and df
T : We present these values in Table 6 for two di¤erent values of the coe¢ cient on
debt stabilization.
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Table 6: The policy constrained by decit to GDP criterion
Parameters of the augmented loss function
d df df
T (%)
10 4 0:0304  1:58
10 5 0:0219  6
Values of the penalty coe¢ cient on the decit to GDP uctuations are small in comparison with penalty
coe¢ cients associated with the variables present in the loss function. At the same time, deterministic component
of the constrained policy involves targeting surplus to GDP equal to 1:6%: The sensitivity analysis reveals that
parameters of the augmented loss function do depend on the chosen value of d: However the general pattern of
the constrained policy is the same. The goal of complying with the decit to GDP criterion is achieved rather
through deterministic component than the stabilization one.
Let us now check how the optimal policy constrained by decit to GDP criterion a¤ects compliance of the
monetary criteria. In Table 7 we present the means and variances of all the Maastricht variables and also report
whether each of the criteria is satised (based on the inequalities (30)(33)).
Table 7: Moments of the Maastricht variables
The policy constrained by decit to GDP criterion
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 4 mean (in %)  4  10 4 2  10 6 -0.0447 -0.0586 -3.6984
variance 0:5802 0:3951 23.7452 2:4352 582.6315
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 5 mean (in %)  0:0001 0.0044 -0.0301 -0.4855 -30.6188
variance 0.5801 0.4030 23.0651 3.1624 1473.1135
criterion violated violated satisfied satisfied satisfied
note: Variances are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
Although the e¤ects of a nonzero target for decit to GDP are quantitatively small we can see that a negative
target for decit to GDP results in smaller discounted means of ination, the nominal exchange rate and (by
denition) also of debt to GDP. On the other hand, mean of the nominal interest rate (and also of aggregate
output) increases as a result of the smaller means of revenue taxes (to be seen later when analyzing the impulse
responses). Moreover, a smaller variance in the decit to GDP triggers smaller variances of the CPI ination
and the nominal interest rate. At the same time, variance of the nominal exchange rate increases (this is in line
with a higher variance of aggregate output - to be later seen in the analysis of impulse responses).
In order to understand how the nature of the policy constrained by decit to GDP criterion di¤ers from the
optimal unconstrained policy, we analyze how both policies respond to the shocks. As previously, we concentrate
on impulse responses to a positive nontraded productivity shock.
[Figure(2) about here]
The policy constrained by scal criterion restricts uctuations of decit to GDP. Accordingly, the scal
component of the constrained policy has a more procyclical nature than the unconstrained policy, i.e. nontraded
taxes increase by less and at the same time home traded taxes decrease by more. Interestingly, the monetary
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policy component of the constrained policy is more contractionary than under the unconstrained policy. Nominal
interest rate decreases by less on impact than under the unconstrained policy leading to a smaller decline in debt
interest payments. As a result, decit to GDP decreases by less (surplus to GDP increases by less) and so does
the debt to GDP. Moreover, the constrained policy is characterized by higher on impact nominal exchange rate
depreciation than under the unconstrained policy. This is consistent with a slightly higher aggregate output
(due to lower taxes). Finally, a higher nominal exchange rate depreciation leads to a higher on impact CPI
ination under the constrained policy.
6.3.3 The optimal policy constrained by all the Maastricht criteria
Having analyzed the impact of monetary and scal criteria separately on the optimal policy, we turn to the
characterization of the optimal policy that complies at the same time with the monetary and scal criteria. In
particular, we analyze which criteria: put more constraints on the optimal policy.
Similarly to previous sections, we present the parameters of such a policy, its moments and also response of
the constrained policy to a positive nontraded productivity shock. Apart from that, we analyze welfare losses
associated with the constrained policy and compare them with the loss of the optimal unconstrained policy. We
also analyze which criteria: monetary or scal contribute the most to the generated loss under the constrained
policy.
The loss function of the policy constrained by scal criterion: decit to GDP and the monetary criteria:
CPI ination and the nominal interest rate can be represented in the following form:
eLt = Lst + 12(T   bt)2 + 12R(RT   bRt)2 + 12df (dfT   dft)2 (59)
where  > 0; R > 0; df > 0 and 
T < 0; RT < 0; dfT < 0: Values of the parameters of such a constrained
policy are obtained from the solution to the minimization problem of the loss function (Lst ) constrained by the
structural equations and scal and monetary criteria. As can be seen in Table 8; penalty coe¢ cients of all the
variables of interest are higher than under the policies that are only constrained by scal or monetary criteria.
This feature reects conicting targets of each of the constrained stabilization policies. As far as targets are
concerned we detect signicant di¤erences for decit to GDP. As previously, we observe that although targets
of decit to GDP and debt do depend on the chosen value of the coe¢ cient d values of the targets of the
monetary variables are not so much sensitive.
Table 8: The policy constrained by all the criteria
Parameters of the augmented loss function
d  R df 
T (in %) RT (in %) dfT (in %)
10 4 36 39 0.26 -0.3601 -0.3684 -3.7143
10 5 38 39 0.06 -0.2045 -0.1884 -20.5072
In Table 9 we show moments of the Maastricht variables under the optimal policy constrained by monetary
and scal criteria. As in the case of the policy constrained by monetary criteria, nominal variables have negative
means. Moreover, a negative target of decit to GDP results in negative means of decit to GDP and also debt
to GDP (the negative e¤ect of decit to GDP on the mean of debt to GDP is stronger than the positive e¤ect of
CPI ination and the nominal interest rate). Variances of the CPI ination and the nominal interest rate are not
signicantly higher than under the policy constrained only by monetary criteria. On the other hand, variance
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of decit to GDP is much higher than under the policy constrained only by the scal criterion. Variance of the
nominal exchange rate is also a bit higher than under the policy constrained by monetary criteria.
Importantly, under chosen reinterpretation of the Maastricht criteria, the nominal exchange rate does not
satisfy the lower (appreciation) bound of the Maastricht criteria. As we know, nominal exchange rate movements
depend on the nominal interest rate behaviour through the uncovered interest rate parity. But since the nominal
exchange rate has a nonstationary character a smaller variance of the nominal interest rate actually increases
persistence of the nominal exchange rate movements (in the extreme situation when nominal interest rate does
not change the nominal exchange rate jumps to the new level on impact and does not change for subsequent
periods). As a result, variance of the nominal exchange rate can overvalue variability of the nominal exchange
rate. That is why, since the variance of the nominal interest rate is 6 times smaller under the constrained
optimal policy than under the unconstrained optimal policy, we assume that the nominal exchange rate criterion
is satised under the optimal policy constrained by all the criteria.
Table 9: Moments of the Maastricht variables
Optimal constrained policy
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 4 mean (in %) -0.1235 -0.1228 -12.2950 -1.0508 -53.6591
variance 0.1012 0.0629 20.7093 4.2714 520.4854
d bt bRt bSt bdf t bbt
10 5 mean (in %) -0.0720 -0.0621 -7.3238 -3.7156 -227.5543
variance 0.0852 0.0485 17.5175 11.7396 2178.8886
criterion satisfied satisfied satisfied31 satisfied satisfied
note: Variances are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
Now we compare the impulse responses of the Maastricht variables to a positive nontraded productivity
shock under the policy constrained by all criteria with the unconstrained optimal policy. The scal component
of the constrained policy has a more countercyclical nature than the unconstrained policy in the rst quarters,
i.e. taxes in the nontraded sector increase by more than under the unconstrained policy, while taxes in the
home traded sector decrease by less than under the unconstrained policy. This reects a higher importance
of the monetary criteria over the scal criterion. Still, changes in taxes are not as pronounced as under the
policy constrained only by monetary criteria. That is why aggregate output increases by more and decit to
GDP decreases by less than under the policy constrained only by monetary criteria. Finally, the monetary
component of the constrained policy features a contractionary behaviour as the policy constrained only by
monetary criteria, i.e. nominal interest rate increases on impact to prevent an increase in CPI ination.
[Figure(4) about here]
Now, we analyze the welfare losses associated with each policy. In Table 10 we report the expected discounted
welfare losses for the policies constrained by scal criterion alone, by monetary criteria alone and by all the
criteria. Importantly, values of the losses are not very much sensitive to the chosen value of debt stabilization
coe¢ cient.
31 in accordance with the discussion above.
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Compliance with the scal criterion does not induce substantial welfare losses. The welfare cost associated
with such a policy is equal to 0.15% of the optimal policy loss. On the other hand, compliance with the monetary
criteria generates additional welfare loss that amounts to 43% of the optimal policy loss. This result reects the
fact scal policy performs relatively poorly as an additional stabilization tool. The welfare losses come mainly
from a higher variability of the domestic ination rates. Obligation to satisfy both monetary and scal criteria
involves more welfare costs. An active use of revenue taxes is limited to meet the bound on decit to GDP
variability. As a result, the policy constrained by monetary and scal criteria produces an additional welfare
cost equal to 60% of the optimal policy loss.
Table 10: Welfare losses for the unconstrained and constrained optimal policy
d UOP COP-decit to GDP COP-monetary criteria COP-all
0 6.6683 -
10 4 6.7242 6.7310 9.5872 10.6250
10 5 6.6786 6.6877 9.4945 9.9510
note: Losses are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal monetary and scal policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria
in a small open economy exposed to domestic and external shocks. We develop a DSGE model of a small open
economy with nominal rigidities and distortionary taxation.
First, we characterize the optimal monetary and scal policy from a timeless perspective using the linear
quadratic approach. We nd that the optimal monetary and scal policy (unconstrained policy) should not
only target ination rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output uctuations but also domestic and
international terms of trade. Second, we analyze how the monetary and scal criteria a¤ect the general prop-
erties of the optimal policy. We show that the policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria di¤ers from the
unconstrained policy along two dimensions: the stochastic and deterministic one. As expected, the constrained
policy restricts uctuations of the Maastricht variables. Moreover, using a precautionary motive such a policy
also changes deterministic targets of the Maastricht variables in order to create an additional bu¤er.
Finally, we also perform a numerical exercise in which we parameterize our model to match the variability
of the Czech Republic economy. We nd that the optimal monetary and scal policy violates three Maastricht
convergence criteria: on the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest rate and decit to GDP ratio. Similarly
to Lipin´ska (2008) the constrained policy leads to a smaller variability of the CPI ination and the nominal
interest rate. Moreover, the policy is characterized by a deationary bias which results in targeting the CPI
ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower by 1.3% (in annual terms) than the CPI ination
rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference.
Importantly, the constrained policy induces a higher variability of decit to GDP ratio than under the uncon-
strained policy. This reects the fact that monetary criteria play a dominant role in a¤ecting the stabilization
process of the constrained policy. Fiscal policy actively uses its instruments to stabilize the economy in the pres-
ence of direct constraints on monetary instruments. At the same time, it has to assign a relatively high surplus
to GDP ratio target in order to comply with all the criteria. Still, the welfare costs of the constrained policy are
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quite substantial and amount to 60% of the initial deadweight loss associated with the optimal unconstrained
policy.
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9.1 Figures - Comparison of di¤erent policies
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10 Appendix B
10.1 The Convergence Criteria in the Maastricht Treaty
The Article 109j(1) of the Maastricht Treaty lays down the following monetary criteria as a prerequisite for
entering the EMU:
 the achievement of a high degree of price stability which means that a Member State (of the EU) has a
sustainable price performance and an average rate of ination (the Consumer Price Index (CPI) ination),
observed over a period of one year before the examination, which does not exceed that of the three best
performing Member States in terms of price stability by more than 1.5% points (the CPI ination rate
criterion);
 the durability of the convergence ... reected in the long term interest rate levels which means that, over
a period of one year before the examination, a Member State has an average nominal long-term interest
rate that does not exceed that of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability by
more than 2% points (the nominal interest rate criterion);
 the observance of the normal uctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the
European Monetary System (15% bound around the central parity), for at least two years, without
devaluing against the currency of any other Member State (the nominal exchange rate criterion).
Importantly, the Maastricht Treaty also imposes the criterion on the scal policy, i.e. the sustainability
of the government nancial position which refers to a government budgetary position without an excessive
decit (Article 104c(6) of the Maastricht Treaty). The treaty stipulates: The sustainability of the government
nancial position will be apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a decit that
is excessive. In practice, the European Commission sets out two criteria:
 the annual government decit: the ratio of the annual government decit to gross domestic product
must not exceed 3% at the end of the proceeding nancial year. If this is not the case, the ratio must
have declined substantially and continuously and reached a level close to 3% (interpretation in trend
terms according to Article 104(2)) or alternatively, must remain close to 3% while representing only an
exceptional and temporary excess
 government debt: the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the
preceding nancial year. If this is not the case, the ratio must have su¢ ciently diminished and must be
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace (interpretation in trend terms according to Article
104(2)).
10.2 Data on EMU Accession Countries
We present gures and data regarding the EMU accession countries. All the data were collected from the
Eurostat database and the European Commission webpage.
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Figure B.1.: Total annual labour productivity growth in the EMU accession
countries and the EU 15 (annual rates in %) for the period 2000 - 2008. Values
for 2007 and 2008 are forecasts.
Table B.1: Structure of the EMU accession countries
countries share of nontradables in consumption share of imports in GDP#
Czech Republic 42% 68%
Estonia 39% 86%
Hungary 44% 71%
Latvia 37% 55%
Lithuania 33% 58%
Poland 37% 35%
Slovenia 49% 59%
Slovakia 41% 78%
average in the EU - 15 51% 63%
note:   average value for the period 2000 - 2005; #  average value for the period 2000 - 2007
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Figure B.2: CPI ination in the EMU accession countries and the EU - 15 in
2000 - 2006 (annual % rates). For the purpose of clarity, CPI ination rates in
Romania are reported only for 2004 - 2006.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2004m
05
2004m
07
2004m
09
2004m
11
2005m
01
2005m
03
2005m
05
2005m
07
2005m
09
2005m
11
2006m
01
2006m
03
2006m
05
2006m
07
2006m
09
2006m
11
2007m
01
2007m
03
2007m
05
2007m
07
months
reference value
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Malta
Poland
Slovenia
Slovakia
Romania
Figure B.3: CPI ination rates in the EMU accession countries since their
accession to the EU (annual rates in %)
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Figure B.4: EMU convergence criterion bond yields for the EMU accession
countries and the euro area in 2001 - 2006 (annual % rates)
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Figure B.5: EMU convergence criterion bond yields for the EMU accession
countries since their accession to the EU (annual rates in %)
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Figure B.6: Nominal exchange rate uctuations vs. euro of the EMU accession
countries since the accession to the EU (average monthly changes since the EU
accession date)
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Figure B.7: Decit to GDP ratio in the EMU Accession Countries in 2000 - 2005
(annual % rates)
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Figure B.8: Debt to GDP ratio in the EMU Accession Countries in 1998 - 2005
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10.3 Characteristics of the model
10.3.1 Parameterization
We present values of the structural parameters and also values of the stochastic parameters chosen in the
numerical exercise.
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Table B.1: Structural parameters
The parameter denition value of the parameter
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  2
inverse of the labour supply elasticity  4
discount factor  0.99
intratemporal elasticity between variety of the goods  10
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables  1.5
elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables  0.5
share of nontradables  0.42
degree of openness  0.4
price rigidity in the nontradable sector N 0.85
price rigidity in the home tradable sector H 0.8
steady state share of taxes in the nontradable sector N 0.19
steady state share of taxes in the tradable sector H 0.19
steady state share of government expenditure in GDP dG 0.2
steady state debt to GDP ratio bD 1.6
Foreign economy:
steady state share of government expenditure in GDP dG 0.2
share of nontradables  0.6
steady state debt to GDP ratio bD 2.4
Table B.2: Stochastic environment
shocks autoregressive parameter standard deviation (in %)
nontradable productivity (AN ) 0.85 1.6
tradable productivity (AH) 0.85 1.8
preference (B) 0.95 0.72
foreign consumption (C) 0.85 0.23
government expenditure (G) 0.8 2
corr( bAN;t; bAH;t) = 0:7 where corr - correlation coe¢ cient
Note: The policy rule is calibrated following Natalucci and Ravenna (2007): bRt = 0:9 bRt 1+0:1(bt+0:2bYt+
0:3bSt) + b"R;t; where SD(b"R;t) = 0:44:
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Table B.3: Matching the moments
Statistics
Standard deviation in % Model Historical
Output: 1.79 1.68
nontraded sector 1.77 1.56
traded sector 3.25 4.32
Consumption 2.08 1.93
Nominal interest rate 0.51 0.52
Nominal exchange rate 2.83 2.59
Real exchange rate 2.36 3.62
CPI ination rate: 0.81 0.91
nontraded sector 0.58 0.97
traded sector 0.92 0.74
Note: The model moments are theoretical. As far as the historical statistics are concerned our data sample
for the Czech Republic is 1995:1 - 2006:2. CPI ination rate in the traded and nontraded sector data sample
is 2000:1 - 2006:2. All series are logged (except for interest and ination rates) and Hodrick - Prescott ltered.
Rates of change are quarterly. All data were collected from the Eurostat webpage. Data are seasonally adjusted
where appropriate. We present the detailed data series. Output: Gross value added (GVA) at 1995 constant
prices in national currency. Traded output is an aggregate of sectoral GVA for: Agriculture; Hunting; Forestry
and Fishing; Total industry (excluding construction). Nontraded output is an aggregate of sectoral GVA
for: Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods; Hotels
and restaurants; Transport, storage and communication; Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and
business activities. Consumption: Final consumption expenditure of households at 1995 constant prices in
national currency. Nominal interest rate: three months T - bill interest rate. Nominal exchange rate: Bilateral
Koruny/euro exchange rate (quarterly average). Real exchange rate: CPI based real e¤ective exchange rate (6
trading partners, quarterly average). CPI ination rate: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). CPI
ination rate in the nontraded sector: HICP - Services. CPI ination in the traded sector: HICP - Goods.
10.3.2 Steady state characterization
We dene a deterministic steady state with zero ination rate. We present a small open economy as the limiting
case of a two country model, i.e. n = 0 and  = 1  : All variables in the steady state are denoted with a bar.
All the shocks take the constant values, in particular: AN = AH = 1; B = 1:32 The discount factors are:
Qt0;t = Q

t0;t = 
t t0 (60)
We assume that the the levels of debt to GDP ratio in both domestic and foreign economy (dG; dG) are
exogenously given. We characterise the steady state with optimal tax rates, i.e. tax rates that maximise welfare
given an exogenous level of debt to GDP ratio. Foreign variables are taken as given.
The optimal tax rates in our small open economy can be derived from the following constrained optimization
problem:
32Foreign consumption is derived from the steady state relations of the foreign economy.
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max
C;YN ;YH ;pN ;pH ;pT ;RS;N ;H
(U(C)  V (YN + YH)) (61)
subject to:
 goodsmarket clearing conditions:
YN = pN
 (C +G); (62)
YH = pH
 pT  (1  )(1  )(C +G) + (1  )pH RSpF
 
(C +G); (63)
 relative prices:
1 = pN
1  + (1  )pT 1 ; (64)
1 = (1  )pH1  + pF
1 
RS
1 
; (65)
 risk sharing condition:
C
 
= RS
 1
C
 
; (66)
 labour market clearing:
pN =

   1
1
1  N (YN + YH)
C

; (67)
pH =

   1
1
1  H (YN + YH)
C

; (68)
where domestic real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption,
i.e. !  (YN + YH)C:
One can dene the markups in both sectors: N   1 11 N ; H   1 11 H :
 government budget constraint:
( 1   1)bD(pNYN + pHYH) = NpNYN + HpHYH   dGY : (69)
Similarly, we present the constrained maximisation problem that solves for the foreign variables:
max
C;Y N ;Y

F ;

N ;

H ;p

N ;p

F
U(C)  V (L) (70)
subject to:
Y N = p

N
 
(C +G); (71)
Y F = (1  )pF
 
(C +G); (72)
1 = pN
1 
+ (1  )pF
1 
; (73)
pN =

   1
1
1  N
(Y N + Y

F )
C

; (74)
pF =

   1
1
1  F
(Y N + Y

F )
C

; (75)
( 1   1)bD(pNY N + pFY F ) = NpNY N + F pFY F   dGC: (76)
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Note that for calibration purposes we derive a steady state in which tax rates are equal in both sectors. The
steady state values of domestic variables (C; YN ; YH ; pN ; pH ; pT ; RS; ) are a solution to the following system
of equations: 8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
YN = pN
 (C +G)
YH = pH
 pT  (1  )(1  )(C +G) + (1  )pH RSpF
 
(C +G)
1 = pN
1  + (1  )pT 1 
1 = (1  )pH1  + pF
1 
RS
1 
C
 
= RS
 1
C
 
pN =

 1
1
1  (YN + YH)
C

pH =

 1
1
1  (YN + YH)
C

( 1   1)bD(pNYN + pHYH) = NpNYN + HpHYH   dGY :
(77)
10.3.3 A loglinearized version of the model
We present a system of the equilibrium conditions for the small open economy in the loglinear form, which is
derived through the rst-order approximation around the deterministic steady state with zero ination described
above. Here, we characterize the dynamic features of this model where the variables with a hat stand for the log
deviations from the steady state. Variables with an asterisk represent the foreign equivalents of the domestic
variables.
The supply-side of the economy is given by two Phillips curves, one for the nontraded and one for the
domestic traded sector, respectively, which are derived from (18):
bN;t = kN ( bCt + bLt   bAN;t    bBt   bpN;t + !NbN;t) + bN;t+1; (78)
bH;t = kH( bCt + bLt   bAH;t    bBt   bpH;t + !HbH;t) + bH;t+1 (79)
where bpN;t  ln(PN;tPt ); bpH;t  ln(PH;tPt ); bN;t  ln( PN;tPN;t 1 ); bH;t  ln( PH;tPH;t 1 ); kN  (1 N )(1 N)N ; kH 
(1 H)(1 H)
H
; !N  N1 N ; !H  H1 H and aggregate labour supply (bLt) is dened through the labour
market clearing condition ((11), (17)):
bLt = edYN (bYN;t   bAN;t) + edYH (bYH;t   bAH;t); (80)
where edYN  Y NY N+Y H ; edYH  Y HY N+Y H are steady state ratios.
It is worth underlining that ination dynamics in both domestic sectors do not only depend on the real
marginal costs in a given sector, but also on the relative prices of goods. In particular, a higher relative price
of goods in one sector in relation to other goods induces a substitution away e¤ect and leads to deationary
pressures in this sector.
The demand side of the small open economy is represented by the market clearing conditions in both
nontraded and domestic traded sectors ((8), (9)):
bYN;t = dCN bCt   bpN;t + dGN bGt; (81)
bYH;t = dCH bCt   bpH;t + b(  )dCH bT dt + (1  dH)cRSt + dCH bCt + b(  )dCH bT dt + dGH bGt (82)
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where dCN  pN  CY N ; dGN  pN
  G
Y N
; dCH  (1 )(1 ) CYH p
 
H p
 
T ; dCH  (1 )C

YH
pH
 RS

pF
 
;
dGH  (1 )(1 ) GYH p
 
H p
 
T ; b  (pN )1 ; b  (pN )1  are steady state ratios. Additionally, we dene
aggregate output as the sum of sector outputs:
bYt = dY N (bpN;t + bYN;t) + dY H(bpH;t + bYH;t); (83)
where dY N  pNYNY and dY H 
pHYH
Y
are steady state ratios.
The complete asset market assumption (15) gives us the following risk sharing condition:
bCt = bBt + 1

cRSt + bCt   bBt : (84)
From the denition of price indices ((5), (6)), we obtain the following relations between relative prices, terms
of trade, domestic terms of trade and real exchange rate:
(a  1)bpH;t = bcT dt + adRSt   badT dt ; (85)
bpN;t = (1  b)cT dt ; (86)
bpH;t =  bcT dt   a bTt; (87)
where a  

RSpF
pT
1 
is the steady state ratio. We also derive the laws of motion for the international terms
of trade and the domestic terms of trade from their denitions:
bTt = (bF;t +bSt)  bH;t + bTt 1; (88)
bT dt = bN;t   bT;t + bT dt 1; (89)
with bT;t  ln( PT;tPT;t 1 ), bF;t  ln( PF;tPF;t 1 ) and bSt = bSt   bSt 1: Tradable ination (bT;t) can be represented as:
bT;t = bH;t + a( bTt   bTt 1): (90)
Dynamics of the government debt can be derived through the loglinerization of equation (23):
bdt = 1

(bdt 1 + bRt   bt)  dsr( bRt + bsrt)
where dsr  Rsrd and real primary surplus ( bsrt) evolves according to the loglinearised version of equation
(21):
bsrt = sN (bN;t + bpN;t + bYN;t) + sH (bH;t + bpH;t + bYH;t)  sG bGt
where sN  NpNY Nsr ; sH  HpHY Hsr and sG  Gsr :
Subsequently, an intertemporal government solvency condition has a following form:
bdt 1   bt    bCt +  bBt = (1  )(  bCt +  bBt + bsrt) + Et(bdt   bt+1    bCt+1 +  bBt+1) (91)
43
Additionally, we present equations dening monetary and scal variables that are constrained by the Maas-
tricht criteria: the CPI ination rate (bt); the nominal interest rate ( bRt) the nominal exchange rate (bSt), decit
to GDP ratio (dft) and debt to GDP ratio (brt). First, the nominal interest rate can be derived from the
loglinearized version of the Euler condition (14):
bRt = ( bCt+1   bBt+1)  ( bCt   bBt) + bt+1; (92)
where bt  ln( PtPt 1 ): CPI aggregate ination is a weighted sum of the sector ination rates:
bt = bbN;t + (1  a)(1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)bF;t + a(1  b)(bSt   bSt 1): (93)
Notice that CPI aggregate ination does not only depend on the domestic sector ination rates, but also on
the foreign traded ination rate and changes in the nominal exchange rate. For example, a nominal exchange
rate depreciation puts an upward pressure on the CPI ination rate.
The nominal exchange rate can be derived from the denition of the real exchange rate:
bSt = bSt 1 + bt   bt + cRSt   cRSt 1: (94)
The law of motion of the nominal exchange rate depends on the real exchange rate uctuations and di¤erences
in the aggregate ination rates between the home and the foreign economy. Additionally, by combining the
international risk sharing condition (84) and Euler conditions for the domestic and foreign economy (92), we
obtain a relation between the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate:
bSt = bRt   bRt + bSt+1:
This equation represents a version of the uncovered interest rate parity, which implies that changes in the
nominal exchange rate result from di¤erences between the domestic and foreign monetary policy. Let us point
out that although very intuitive, this equation does not constitute an independent equilibrium condition.
Decit to GDP ratio depends on primary surplus and interest rate payments on debt:
dft =
dt 1
Rt 1
t(Rt 1   1)  srt
Yt
:
From denition steady state ratio of decit to GDP ratio is zero. Therefore the loglinearised version of the
above equation is:
edf t = d
Y
(1  )bdt 1 + d
Y
(1  )bt +  d
Y
bRt 1   sr
Y
bsrt; (95)
where edf t = dft:
Finally, debt to GDP evolves according to the following equation:
bbrt = bdt   bYt   bRt: (96)
The system is closed by specifying a monetary and scal rule. In this paper, we derive the optimal monetary
and scal policy rule which maximizes welfare of the society subject to the structural equations of the economy.
The optimal rule is specied as a rule where the monetary and scal authority stabilizes the target variables in
order to minimize the welfare loss of society and provide the most e¢ cient allocation.33
33Giannoni and Woodford (2003) call these type of rules exible ination targeting rules.
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Summing up, the dynamics of the small open economy are summarized by the following variables, bN;t;bH;t; bCt; bLt; bYH;t; bYN;t; bpN;t; bpH;t; bYt; cRSt; bT dt ; bTt; bSt; bt; bRt; bN;t; bH;t; bdt; bdf t; bbrt which are determined by
equations (78)(96), given the evolution of the stochastic shocks bAN;t; bAH;t; bBt; bGt and the foreign variablesbCt ; bT dt ; bt ; bF;t:34
11 Appendix C
11.1 Quadratic representation of the optimal loss function
11.1.1 The second order approximation of the welfare function
We present a second order approximation to the welfare function (1):
Wt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0vbvt   12bv0tZvbvt   bv0tZbt] + tip+O(3) (97)
where bv0t = h bCt bYN;t bYH;t bN;t bH;t i ; b0t = h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt bGt i ; tip stands for terms
independent of policy and O(3) includes terms that are of order higher than the second in the deviations of
variables from their steady state values. The matrices zv; Zv; Z are dened below:
z0v =
h
1  sCYN  sCYH 0 0
i
; (98)
Zv =
26666664
  1 0 0 0 0
0 sCYN (1 + 
edYN ) sCYN edYH 0 0
0 sCYN
edYH sCYH (1 +  edYH ) 0 0
0 0 0 sCYN

kN
0
0 0 0 0 sCYH

kH
37777775 ; (99)
Z =
26666664
0 0   0
 sCYN (1 +  edYN )  sCYN edYH 0 0
 sCYN edYH  sCYH (1 +  edYH ) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
37777775 : (100)
where sCYN =
!YN
C
; sCYH =
!YH
C
:
11.1.2 Elimination of the linear terms
This section describes in detail how we eliminate the linear terms in the second order approximation to the
welfare function in order to obtain a quadratic loss function. Moreover we reduce the number of structural
variables that represent the policy problem by appropriate substitutions.
The optimal monetary and scal policy solves the welfare maximization problem with the constraints given by
the structural equations of the economy (their loglinearized versions are (78) - (91)). The matrix representation
of the second order approximation to the welfare function is the following:
34For simplicity, we choose to consider only one type of external shocks, foreign consumption shocks ( bCt ). As a result, bT dt ; bt ;bF;t are assumed to be zero. Moreover, all shocks follow an AR(1) process with normally distributed innovations.
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W = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0xbxt   12bx0tZxbxt   bx0tZbt] + tip+O(3): (101)
Similarly we present a second order approximation to all the structural equations in the matrix form:
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
26664
A1 bxt
A2 bxt
:::
A14 bxt
37775+ 12
26664
bxt0B1 bxtbxt0B2 bxt
:::bxt0B14 bxt
37775+
26664
bxt0C1 btbxt0C2 bt
:::bxt0C14 bt
37775] + tip+O(3) = 0 (102)
with
bx0t = h bYt bLt bCt bYN;t bYH;t bpN;t bpH;t bT dt bTt cRSt dSt bH;t bN;t bT;t bN;t bH;t i ; (103)
b0t  h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt bGt i
where tip means terms independent of policy.
Following the methodology of Benigno and Woodford (2005) in order to eliminate the linear terms in the
welfare function we solve the system of linear equations:
A = z
0
x (104)
where A(1416) =
26664
A1
A2
:::
A14
37775;
(114) =
h
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
i
and zx(161):
As a result we obtain the loss function:
Lt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
bx0tLxbxt + bx0tLbt] + tip+O(3) (105)
where
Lx = Zx + 1B1 + 2B2 + 4B4 + 6B6 + 9B9 + 10B10 + 11B11 + 12B12 + 13B13 + 14B14; (106)
L = Z + 1C1 + 2C2 + 4C4 + 6C6 + 13C13 + 14C14: (107)
11.1.3 Substitution of the variables
We want to represent the loss function (105) and also the whole model just in terms of the following variables:
by0t = h bYt bT dt bTt bSt bH;t bN;t bT;t bN;t bH;t i : (108)
In order to do this we dene matrices Nx(169) and N(146) that map all the variables in the vector y0t in
the following way:
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bxt = Nxby0t +N 0bt (109)
where:
Nx =
2666666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
lY ltd lt 0 0 0 0 0 0
cY ctd ct 0 0 0 0 0 0
yny yntd ynt 0 0 0 0 0 0
yhy yhtd yht 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 pntd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 phtd pht 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 rstd rst 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3777777777777777777777777777777775
; (110)
Nx =
2666666666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0
lan lah lB 0 lG
0 0 cB 0 cG
0 0 ynb 0 yng
0 0 yhb 0 yhg
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777777777777777777777775
(111)
with parameters dened below:
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pntd = 1  b (112)
phtd =  b (113)
pht =  a (114)
rstd =  b (115)
rst = 1  a (116)
yhc = dCH + dCH (117)
cY =
1
dY NdCN + dY Hyhc
(118)
cB = cY dCHdY H (119)
cG =  cY (dY NdGN + dY HdGH) (120)
ct = cY (adY H(1  )  dY H(1  dH)(1  a) + 1

dY HdCH(1  a)) (121)
ctd = cY (dY N (1  b)(  1) + bdY H(1  ) + b(   )dHdY H + (122)
+(1  dH)dY Hb  dCH 1

dY Hb) (123)
yny = cY dCN (124)
yntd = dCNctd    (1  b) (125)
ynb = dCNcb (126)
yng = dGN + dCNcg (127)
ynt = dCNct (128)
yhy =
1  dY Nyny
dY H
(129)
yhtd =  dY Nyntd  (dY N (1  b)  bdY H)
dY H
(130)
yht =  dY N
dY H
ynt+ a (131)
yhb =  dY N
dY H
ynb (132)
yhg =  dY N
dY H
yng (133)
ltd = edY N  yntd+ edY H  yhtd (134)
lt = edY N  ynt+ edY H  yht (135)
lan =  edY N (136)
lab =  edY H (137)
lB = edY N  ynb+ edY H  yhb (138)
lG = edY N  yng + edY H  yhg (139)
lY = edY N  yny + edY H  yhy (140)
The loss function can be expressed now as:
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Lt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
by0tLybyt + by0tL;ybt] + tip+O(3) (141)
where:
Ly = N
0
xLxNx; (142)
L;y = N
0
xLxN +N
0
xL: (143)
Since variables [St; T;t] do not appear in the original welfare objective function and in the second order
terms of the structural equations we can further reduce the set of the variables which appear in the loss function
to:
by0t = h bYt bT dt bTt bH;t bN;t bN;t bH;t i : (144)
The nal set of the structural equations which represent the constraints of the maximization problem is:
bN;t = kNcmcN;rt + bN;t+1; (145)bH;t = kHcmcH;rt + bH;t+1; (146)
0 = nY bYt + nTd bT dt + nT bTt + nB bBt + nG bGt   bCt ; (147)
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1) (148)
bdt 1 = fNbN;t + fHbH;t + fY bYt + fTd bT dt + fT bTt + fTd(+1) bT dt+1 + fT (+1) bTt+1 + fT ( 1) bTt 1 + (149)
+fN bN;t + fHbH;t + fN(+1)bN;t+1 + fH(+1)bH;t+1 +  bdt + (150)
+fG bGt + fB bBt + fC bCt   fC(+1) bCt+1 (151)
where:
cmcN;rt = mN;Y bYt +mN;Td bT dt +mN;T bTt +mN;NbN;t + (152)
+mN;AN
bAN;t +mN;AH bAH;t +mN;B bBt +mN;G bGt (153)cmcH;rt = mH;Y bYt +mH;Td bT dt +mH;T bTt +mH;HbH;t + (154)
+mH;AN
bAN;t +mH;AH bAH;t +mH;B bBt +mH;G bGt (155)
with:
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mN;Y = cY + lY  (156)
mN;Td =   ctd+   ltd  pntd (157)
mN;T =   ct+   lt (158)
mN;N = !N (159)
mN;AN =  (1 +   edY N ) (160)
mN;AH =   edY H (161)
mN;B =   (cB   1) +   lb (162)
mN;G = cG + lG (163)
mH;Y = cY + lY  (164)
mH;Td =   ctd+   ltd  phtd (165)
mH;T =   ct+   lt  pht (166)
mH;H = !H (167)
mH;AN =   edY N (168)
mH;AH =  (1 +   edY H) (169)
mH;B =   (cB   1) +   lB (170)
mH;G = cG + lG (171)
nY = cY (172)
nTd = ctd 
1

rstd (173)
nT = ct  1

rst (174)
nB = cb  1 (175)
nG = cg (176)
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fN = (1  )sN (177)
fH = (1  )sH (178)
fY = (1  )(sN yny + sHyhy) (179)
fTd = (1  )(sN (yny + pntd) + sH (yhy + phtd)) + rstd (180)
f
Td(+1)
= rstd (181)
fT = (1  )(sN yny + sH (yhy + pht) + a(1  b)(1 + )) + rst (182)
fT (+1) = (a(1  b) + rst) (183)
fT ( 1) =  a(1  b) (184)
fN = b (185)
fH = (1  b) (186)
fN(+1) = b (187)
fH(+1) = (1  b) (188)
fG = (1  )(sN yng + sHyhg) (189)
fB = (1  )(sN ynb+ sHyhb) (190)
fC =  (191)
fC(+1) =   (192)
Structural equations dening the Maastricht variables:
bRt = bbN;t+1+(1 b)bH;t+1 (1 cb)( bBt+1  bBt)+(bYt+1  bYt)+ctd( bT dt+1  bT dt )+(ct+a(1 b))( bTt+1  bTt);
(193)
bt = bbN;t + (1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)( bTt   bTt 1); (194)
bSt = bSt 1 + bt + rstd( bT dt   bT dt 1) + rst( bTt   bTt 1); (195)
edf t = dd bdt 1 + d(bbN;t + (1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)( bTt   bTt 1)) + dR bRt 1 + (196)
+dsr(srNbN;t + srHbH;t + srTd bT dt + srT bTt + srY bYt + srB bBt + srG bGt); (197)
bbrt = bdt   bYt   bRt; (198)
where the parameters are dened below:
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dd =
d
Y
(1  )
d =
d
Y
(1  ) (199)
dR = 
d
Y
(200)
dsr =  sr
Y
(201)
srTd = sN (pntd+ yntd) + sH (phtd+ yhtd) (202)
srT = sN ynt+ sH (pht+ yht) (203)
srY = sN yny + sHyhy (204)
srB = sN ynb+ sHyhb (205)
srG = sN yng + sHyhg   sG (206)
11.2 Reinterpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria
We show how to reinterpret each of the Maastricht criteria in order to be able to use the method of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997, 1999).
11.2.1 Exchange rate criterion
We reinterpret the criterion on the nominal exchange rate (32) into two inequalities given below:35
E
 bSt  k  SD( bSt)   15%; (207)
E
 bSt+ k  SD( bSt)  15%: (208)
where k is large enough to prevent from violating the criterion (32) and SD refers to the standard deviation
statistic.
These two inequalities can be represented as the following two sets of inequalities (to conform with the
welfare measure we use discounted statistics):8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)  0
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)!2 ; (209)
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=0
t

15%  bSt  0
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

15%  bSt2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t

15%  bSt!2 ; (210)
where K = 1 + k 2:
35E stands for the expectation operator and SD stands for the standard deviation operator.
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11.2.2 Ination criterion
We redene the condition (30). We assume that the average ination in the domestic economy should be at
least k standard deviations smaller than the average ination in the foreign economy plus a margin summarized
by B (where B = 4
p
1; 015  1):
E(bt)  E(bt ) +B   kSD(bt) (211)
where bt; bt are treated as deviations from the zero ination steady state in the domestic economy and
the foreign one accordingly (i.e.  =  = 0) and k large enough to prevent from violating criterion (30). We
assume that the foreign economy is in the steady state so bt = 0 8t: As a result our restriction (211) becomes:
E(bt)  B   kSD(bt): (212)
Since B is a constant we can use the following property of the variance: V ar(bt) = V ar(B   bt): Our
restriction becomes:
kSD(B   bt)  E(B   bt): (213)
This restriction can be represented as a set of two restrictions:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t (B   t)  0; (214)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t (B   bt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t (B   bt)!2 : (215)
11.2.3 Nominal interest rate criterion
Similarly to the criterion on the CPI aggregate ination we interpret the inequality (31):
E( bRt)  E( bRt ) + CR   kSD( bRt) (216)
where k is large enough to prevent from frequent violating the criterion (31) and CR = 4
p
1; 02  1.
As in the case of the foreign ination we assume that bRt = 0 8t: So the restriction (216) becomes:
kSD(CR   bRt)  E(CR   bRt): (217)
This inequality can be represented as a set of two inequalities:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt  0; (218)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt!2 : (219)
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11.2.4 Decit to GDP criterion
Finally we interpret the inequality (33) that summarizes decit to GDP criterion:
E( bdf t)  Fdf   kSD( bdf t) (220)
where k is large enough to prevent from frequent violating the criterion (33) and Fdf = 3%.
Subsequently, this inequality can be represented as a set of two inequalities:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

Fdf   bdf t  0; (221)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

Fdf   bdf t2  K
 
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

Fdf   bdf t
!2
: (222)
11.3 The constrained loss function
We provide the proof of the Proposition 1 stated in the main text. Since all the sets of the constraints have a
similar structure the proof concerns the optimal monetary policy with only one constraint on the CPI ination
rate. The proof is based on the proof of Proposition 6.9 in Woodford (2003).
Proposition 2 Consider the problem of minimizing an expected discounted sum of quadratic losses:
Et0
(
(1  )
1X
t=t0
tLt
)
(223)
subject to (36) - (37). Let m1;; m2; be the discounted average values of (B   bt) and (B   bt)2 associated
with the optimal policy. Then the optimal policy also minimizes a modied discounted loss criterion of the form
(223) with Lt replaced by: eLt  Lt +(T   bt)2 (224)
under constraints represented by the structural equations. Importantly   0 and takes strictly positive value
if and only if the constraint (37) binds. Moreover if the constraint (37) binds the corresponding target value T
is negative and given by the following relation:
T = B  Km1; < 0: (225)
Proof. Let m1; and m2; be the discounted average values of (B   t) and (B   t)2 associated with the
policy that solves the constrained optimization problem stated in the corollary. Let m1; and m

2; be the
values of these moments for the policy that minimizes (223) without additional constraints. Notice that since
m1; = B the constraint (36) does not bind.
36 We identify the deterministic component of policy, i.e. m1; and
also the stabilization component of policy which is: m2; (m1;)2. Moreover we also conclude thatm1;  m1;
since there is no advantage from choosing m1; such that: m1; < m1; - both constraints set only the lower
bound on the value of m1; for any value of the stabilization component of policy. If one chooses m1; such
that: m1; > m1; then one can relax the constraint (37). So m1;  m1;. Based on the above discussion we
formulate two alternative constraints to the constraints (36, 37):
(1  )E0
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)  m1;; (226)
36Means of all the variables under the unconstrained optimal policy are zero.
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(1  )E0
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)2  m2;: (227)
Observe that any policy that satises the above constraints satises also the weaker constraints: (36, 37). Now
we take advantage of the Kuhn Tucker theorem: the policy that minimizes (223) subject to (226, 227) also
minimizes the following loss criterion:
E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
tLt
)
  1;E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
t (B   bt))+
2;E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)2) (228)
where 1; and 2; are the Lagrange multipliers which are nonnegative. If (37) binds then we obtain the
following relation between the multipliers:
1; = 2Km1;2; (229)
since m2; = Km21;.
Rearranging the terms in (228) we can dene the new loss function as:
eLt  Lt + 2; (B   bt)  1;22;
2
(230)
where the nal term appears only when 2; > 0: Therefore  = 2;  0 and takes a strictly positive value
only if (37) binds. Moreover for  > 0 we have that:
T = B  
1;
22:
= B  Km1;: (231)
Notice that the target value for the CPI ination is negative (since K > 1 and m1;  B):
T = B  Km1; < 0: (232)
11.4 Unconstrained optimal monetary and scal policy
We derive the rst order conditions for the unconstrained optimal monetary and scal policy.
minLt0 = UCC
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
y(bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12Td( bT dt   bT dTt )2 + 12T ( bTt   bTTt )2 + (233)
1
2
N (bN;t   bTN;t)2 + 12H (bH;t   bTH;t)2 +Y Td bYt bT dt +Y T bYt bTt +TdT bT dt bTt + (234)
+bN;t(Y N bYt +TN bTt +TdN bT dt ) + bH;t(Y H bYt +TH bTt +TdH bT dt ) + (235)
+
1
2
N b2N;t + 12Hb2H;t] + tip+O(3) (236)
subject to :
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bN;t = kN (mN;Y bYt+mN;Td bT dt +mN;T bTt+mN;NbN;t+mN;AN bAN;t+mN;AH bAH;t+mN;B bBt+mN;G bGt)+bN;t+1;
(237)
bH;t = kH(mH;Y bYt+mH;Td bT dt +mH;T bTt+mH;HbH;t+mH;AN bAN;t+mH;AH bAH;t+mH;B bBt+mH;G bGt)+bH;t+1;
(238)
bCt = nY bYt + nTd bT dt + nT bTt + nB bBt + nB bBt; (239)
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1); (240)
bdt 1 = fNbN;t + fHbH;t + fY bYt + fTd bT dt + fT bTt + fTd(+1) bT dt+1 + fT (+1) bTt+1 + fT ( 1) bTt 1 + (241)
+fN bN;t + fHbH;t + fN(+1)bN;t+1 + fH(+1)bH;t+1 +  bdt + (242)
+fG bGt + fB bBt + fC bCt   fC(+1) bCt+1 (243)
First order conditions of the minimization problem:
 wrt bN;t :
0 = N bN;t + 1;t   1;t 1   4;t   fN5;t    1fN(+1)5;t 1; (244)
 wrt bH;t :
0 = HbH;t + 2;t   2;t 1 + 4;t   fH5;t    1fH(+1)5;t 1; (245)
 wrt bYt :
0 = Y (bYt   bY Tt ) + Y Td bT dt +Y T bTt   kNmN;Y 1;t (246)
 kHmH;Y 2;t   nY 3;t   fY 5;t; (247)
 wrt bT dt :
0 = Td( bT dt   bT dTt ) + TTd bTt +Y Td bYt   kNmN;Td1;t   kHmH;Td2;t (248)
 nTd3;t + 4;t   4;t+1   fTd5;t    1fTd(+1)5;t 1; (249)
 wrt bTt :
0 = T ( bTt   bTTt ) + TTd bT dt +Y T bYt   kNmN;T 1;t   kHmH;T 2;t (250)
 nT 3;t + a4;t   a4;t+1   fT 5;t    1fTd(+1)5;t 1   fT ( 1)5;t+1; (251)
 wrt bdt :
0 =  5;t + 5;t+1; (252)
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 wrt bN;t :
0 = N (bN;t   bTN;t) + Y N bYt +TN bTt +TdN bT dt + (253)
 kNmN;N1;t   fN5;t; (254)
 wrt bH;t :
0 = H (bH;t   bTH;t) + Y H bYt +TH bTt +TdH bT dt + (255)
 kHmH;H2;t   fH5;t: (256)
11.5 Constrained optimal monetary and scal policy
We derive the rst order conditions for the optimal policy that satises the additional criteria on the nominal
interest, the CPI aggregate ination and decit to GDP ratio.
minLct0 = UCC
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
y(bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12Td( bT dt   bT dTt )2 + 12T ( bTt   bTTt )2 + (257)
1
2
N (bN;t   bTN;t)2 + 12H (bH;t   bTH;t)2 +Y Td bYt bT dt +Y T bYt bTt +TdT bT dt bTt + (258)
+bN;t(Y N bYt +TN bTt +TdN bT dt ) + bH;t(Y H bYt +TH bTt +TdH bT dt ) + (259)
+
1
2
N b2N;t + 12Hb2H;t + (260)
+
1
2
(
T   bt)2 + 1
2
R(R
T   bRt)2 + 1
2
df (df
T   dft)2] + tip+O(3) (261)
subject to :
bN;t = kN (mN;Y bYt+mN;Td bT dt +mN;T bTt+mN;NbN;t+mN;AN bAN;t+mN;AH bAH;t+mN;B bBt+mN;G bGt)+bN;t+1;
(262)
bH;t = kH(mH;Y bYt+mH;Td bT dt +mH;T bTt+mH;HbH;t+mH;AN bAN;t+mH;AH bAH;t+mH;B bBt+mH;G bGt)+bH;t+1;
(263)
bCt = nY bYt + nTd bT dt + nT bTt + nB bBt + nB bBt; (264)
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1); (265)
bdt 1 = fNbN;t + fHbH;t + fY bYt + fTd bT dt + fT bTt + fTd(+1) bT dt+1 + fT (+1) bTt+1 + fT ( 1) bTt 1 + (266)
+fN bN;t + fHbH;t + fN(+1)bN;t+1 + fH(+1)bH;t+1 +  bdt + (267)
+fG bGt + fB bBt + fC bCt   fC(+1) bCt+1 (268)
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bt = bbN;t + (1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)( bTt   bTt 1); (269)bRt = bbN;t+1+(1 b)bH;t+1 (1 cb)( bBt+1  bBt)+(bYt+1  bYt)+ctd( bT dt+1  bT dt )+(ct+a(1 b))( bTt+1  bTt);
(270)
edf t = dd bdt 1 + d(bbN;t + (1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)( bTt   bTt 1)) + dR bRt 1 + (271)
+dsr(srNbN;t + srHbH;t + srTd bT dt + srT bTt + srY bYt + srB bBt + srG bGt); (272)
First order conditions of the minimization problem:
 wrt bN;t :
0 = N bN;t + 1;t   1;t 1   4;t   fN5;t    1fN(+1)5;t 1 (273)
 b6;t    1b7;t   bd8;t; (274)
 wrt bH;t :
0 = HbH;t + 2;t   2;t 1 + 4;t   fH5;t    1fH(+1)5;t 1 (275)
 (1  b)6;t    1(1  b)7;t   (1  b)d8;t; (276)
 wrt bYt :
0 = Y (bYt   bY Tt ) + Y Td bT dt +Y T bTt   kNmN;Y 1;t (277)
 kHmH;Y 2;t   nY 3;t   fY 5;t + (278)
+7;t    17;t 1   dsrsrY 8;t; (279)
 wrt bT dt :
0 = Td( bT dt   bT dTt ) + TTd bTt +Y Td bYt   kNmN;Td1;t   kHmH;Td2;t (280)
 nTd3;t + 4;t   4;t+1   fTd5;t    1fTd(+1)5;t 1 (281)
+ctd7;t    1ctd7;t 1   dsrsrTd8;t; (282)
 wrt bTt :
0 = T ( bTt   bTTt ) + TTd bT dt +Y T bYt   kNmN;T 1;t   kHmH;T 2;t (283)
 nT 3;t + a4;t   a4;t+1   fT 5;t    1fTd(+1)5;t 1   fT ( 1)5;t+1 (284)
 a(1  b)6;t + a(1  b)6;t+1 + (285)
(ct+ a(1  b))7;t   (ct+ a(1  b)) 17;t 1; (286)
 wrt bdt :
0 =  5;t + 5;t+1   dd8;t+1; (287)
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 wrt bN;t :
0 = N (bN;t   bTN;t) + Y N bYt +TN bTt +TdN bT dt + (288)
 kNmN;N1;t   fN5;t   dsrsrN8;t (289)
 wrt bH;t
0 = H (bH;t   bTH;t) + Y H bYt +TH bTt +TdH bT dt + (290)
 kHmH;H2;t   fH5;t   dsrsrH8;t (291)
 wrt bRt :
0 = R( bRt  RT ) + 5;t   dR8;t+1; (292)
 wrt bt :
0 = (bt   T ) + 6;t; (293)
 wrt edf t :
0 = df ( edf t   dfT ) + 8;t: (294)
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